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FROM ASHES TO FIRE: TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT IN TRANSITION
GERARD

N. MAGLIOCCA*

This Article explores the parallels between current developments
in copyright law and the evolution of unfair competition doctrine in the
early twentieth century. In each case, influential segments of the legal
establishment responded to a major technologicalupheavalby rejecting
gradual reform. They argued that the existing regulatory framework
was so obsolete that only a radical overhaul could address the new
paradigm. In the unfair competition context, that impulse led to the
creation of misappropriation,dilution, and the right of publicity, all of
which reshaped intellectualproperty even though they did not supplant
traditionalprinciples. In copyright, a similarprocess is underway in
the wake of the Internet Revolution that may have profound
consequences. The analysis concludes by examining the relationship
between the three radical unfair competition proposals and their
counterpartsin copyright in order to project the future of the law.
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INTRODUCTION

Schechter's
dilution concept
was a direct, though
disproportionate, response to the shortcomings of the consumer
confusion test in light of burgeoning trade .... [I]t was
originally conceived ... as a radical alternative to the consumer
protection model of trademark rights.'
Robert N. Klieger
Giving copyright holders the sole right to exploit commercially
or authorize the commercial exploitation of their works is a
more constrained grant than the current capacious statutory
language.... Is surgery that radical necessary? Probably not.
It would, however, have some significant advantages.2
Jessica Litman
In 2003 the Supreme Court decided two of the most highly
anticipated intellectual property cases in recent years. Eldred v.
Ashcroft3 rejected a constitutional challenge to the Copyright Term
Extension Act,4 which lengthened copyright protection by twenty
1. Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis
for Trademark Protection,58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 797 (1997).
2. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 181 (2001).
3. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
4. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
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A few weeks later, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. 6
years.'
marked the Court's first encounter with the controversial doctrine of
trademark dilution, which gives marks protection that extends far
beyond the reach of traditional unfair competition law.7 At first
glance, these opinions seem to have little in common other than their
proximity in time. After all, one was a copyright case about
constitutional law, while the other was a trademark decision
interpreting a new federal statute.
This Article contends that Eldred and Moseley actually share a
close bond that illuminates the problems plaguing contemporary
copyright policy. In both cases, the Court was addressing radical
arguments that grew out of frustration with the law's inability to
adjust to new economic conditions. Trademark dilution-the subject
of Moseley-was a sweeping doctrine proposed in the 1920s by a
scholar who contended that trademark protection needed to expand
dramatically in response to the Industrial Revolution.9 By contrast,
the failings of copyright law are an ongoing concern because its
formal protection is expanding when many believe it should be
contracting in response to the Internet Revolution. 10 In our era, it
was another scholar-Lawrence Lessig-who reacted by making the
unprecedented argument in Eldred that the Constitution imposes
judicially enforceable limits on Congress's power to expand
copyrights."
This parallel between Eldred and Moseley sets the stage for a
sections of 17 U.S.C.).
5. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 192-94.
6. 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
7. See id. at 429.
8. See id. at 432-33 (describing the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, Pub. L. No.
104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (2000))).
9. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,40 HARV. L.
REV. 813, 830-33 (1927); see also Klieger, supra note 1, at 800-01 (outlining twentieth
century developments in trademark law); Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable:
Dilution and Infringement in Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 974-77 (2001)
(describing Schechter's proposals for reform).
10. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster
and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 267 (2002)
(arguing that digital technology's effect on the cost of distributing content reduces the
need for copyright protection); see also Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17
U.S.C. § 512 (2000) (placing new restrictions on the digital transmission of data). Though
this Article draws a parallel between the Industrial Revolution and the Internet
Revolution, it does not state that they are equivalent. The point is that each involves a
technological change of sufficient magnitude to trigger the pattern of evolutionary and
revolutionary reform that the Article describes.
11. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192-93 (2003); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's
FirstAmendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1066-67 (2001).
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lesson in the unanticipated consequences of reform. All legal systems
must balance the desire for stability with the need to adapt old
principles to new circumstances. Courts are charged with resolving
these competing goals in concrete cases, but there are instances when
a major technological or social shift calls for a more substantial
reconsideration of doctrine. Naturally, these upheavals lead to an
extended dialogue among judges, academics, and legislators seeking
to reach a consensus about how to update the law by reshaping
existing concepts.
That was how the difficulties confronting
trademark were resolved in the twentieth century, and the odds are
12
that copyright will follow a similar path in the twenty-first century.
Yet whenever a body of law goes through a period of
obsolescence, some inevitably become impatient with gradual change
and start proposing radical alternatives to the status quo. This usually
starts with academics proclaiming that the prevailing doctrine is so
outmoded that only a complete overhaul can solve the problem. 3 If
the reform process continues to stagnate, then those radical ideas may
begin seeping from law reviews into courts and legislatures. 4 And
over time, these new doctrines can develop independent justifications
that keep them alive long after the obsolescence that provoked them
disappears. Thus, a central proposition of this Article is that
significant reform is almost always accompanied by the creation of
"satellite doctrines" that either break new ground or become a source
of mischief.
Modern unfair competition law was forged by this dynamic
combination of revolution and evolution. The problems that gripped
trademark doctrine in the Industrial Age led directly to the creation
of misappropriation, dilution, and the right of publicity. 5 All of these
concepts were grounded in the inadequacy of the common law, and
all three responded by developing new property rights that would
12. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)
(setting forth the modern eight factor test for trademark infringement); Magliocca, supra
note 9, at 994-1005.
13. See Lessig, supra note 11, at 1072-73; Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A
Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 409-11 (2002); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of
Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 203, 214 (1954); Schechter, supranote 9, at 813.
14. See Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of
Misappropriationand Other Common Law Theories of Protectionfor Intellectual Property,
11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 408-12 (1998); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public
Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 177-78 (1993);
Magliocca, supra note 9, at 994-99.
15. See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 241-42 (1918); Haelan
Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953); Nimmer, supra
note 13, at 213-14; Schechter, supra note 9, at 823-24.
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bring about a swift expansion of trademark protection. In so doing,
however, they have been sharply criticized because their breadth
threatens to destroy the delicate balance intellectual property law
must strike between providing private incentives and protecting the
public domain.16 Indeed, most of the debate about unfair competition
doctrine still centers on what role these ideas rooted in a past crisis
should have today.
The value of this history is that copyright is now in the early
stages of a similar transformation.
Unlike what occurred in
trademark law, however, many copyright scholars are now racing to
find ways to narrow its protection in the face of technologies that are
sharply reducing the cost of distributing content." This new batch of
satellite doctrines is only in its infancy. The trademark precedents
indicate, though, that unless copyright law responds quickly to the
Internet Revolution, these concepts may become powerful
challengers to the established regulatory framework. By examining
the process in midstream, this Article offers a glimpse into the future
of copyright.
Part I explores how the Industrial Revolution wiped out the
narrow
premises
underlying
trademark
law
and
how
misappropriation, dilution, and the right of publicity developed in
response. The text then examines the evolution of those doctrines
and shows that two of them, dilution and the right of publicity,
continued to gain support even after the obsolescence of mainstream
doctrine was cured. Part II explains how digital technology is eroding
the broad foundation of copyright protection. 8 Next, the discussion
looks at three ideas recently put forward by scholars who want to
curtail copyright in a dramatic fashion. One is Professor Lessig's

16. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929) (limiting
the holding in InternationalNews to its facts); Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the
Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167 (1948)
(stating that whether trademark protections "further public as well as private goals" was
the key inquiry).
17.

See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:

THE FATE OF THE

COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 249-59 (2001) (setting forth the ideals of
information exchange and protection in the digital age and the changes in copyright law
necessary to achieve them); LITMAN, supra note 2, at 180-86 (arguing for a "commercial
exploitation" standard of copyright infringement that better captures the public's
understanding of copyright law); Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV.
775, 786-87 (2003) (proposing "fair use across time" as a limit on "creeping copyright
terms").
18. The claim that copyright should contract as a response to the Internet is obviously
more controversial than the related argument, which is now widely accepted, that
trademark rights had to expand after the Industrial Revolution.
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aforementioned resort to the Constitution, another seeks to redefine
drastically the test for copyright infringement, and the third offers a
potentially sweeping expansion of the fair use exception. Finally, the
analysis demonstrates that these novel theories are analogous to the
unfair competition satellite doctrines and shows how they may evolve
into the equivalents of trademark concepts related to commercial use
and abandonment.
I. THE SCHISM IN UNFAIR COMPETITION

When students take a course in unfair trade practices, they are
confronted by a hodge podge of doctrines that often seem totally
disconnected. Yet just as the Romance languages all have a common
Latin root, the major concepts in unfair competition are all offshoots
of the common law action for trademark infringement. Invasions by
the likes of Attila the Hun gave us our linguistic diversity, but it was
the Industrial Revolution that shattered the unity of trademark. This
Part looks at that process and examines how misappropriation,
dilution, and the right of publicity began as radical attacks on the
common law but eventually grew into respectable ideas that still exert
a powerful influence on courts and legislatures.
A.

The Lost World of Trademarks
Let us begin by reviewing the system of trademark protection
that prevailed from time immemorial until the twentieth century. At
common law, a mark owner had a cause of action for infringement
only if the defendant (1) was a direct competitor and (2) claimed that
its goods were made by the plaintiff. 9 The first limitation was
summarized in a statement by the Court of Chancery: "If [someone]
does not carry on a trade in iron, but carries on a trade in linen, and
' 2°
stamps a lion on his linen, another person may stamp a lion on iron.
In other words, the rule was that relief could not be granted unless a
defendant made exactly the same type of good as the plaintiff.21 The
next element, which was called "passing off" or "palming off," held
19. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 13, at 210-12 (discussing in detail the common law
requirements for infringement).
20. Ainsworth v. Walmsley, 1 L.R.-Eq. 518, 524-25 (Eng. Ch. 1866); see Edward C.
Lukens, The Application of the Principle of Unfair Competition to Cases of Dissimilar
Products,75 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 198 (1927).
21. See, e.g., Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724, 728 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 81-134 (repealed 1946)) (limiting infringement to goods of "substantially the
same descriptive properties as those set forth in [the senior user's] registration"); Borden
Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1912) (denying
an infringement action because milk and ice cream were not identical products).
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that liability attached only if a defendant represented that its products
were from the plaintiff and that the misrepresentation caused a
diversion of sales.2 2 Thus, a plaintiff could not prevail in an
infringement action by showing that consumers were just likely to be
confused by the use of a similar mark.23
These limitations stand in sharp contrast to the way current
trademark law operates. First, there is no longer a direct competition
requirement. Courts do consider the competitive proximity of
products in infringement suits, but now most of those cases involve
different types of goods.24 Plaintiffs today also do not have to show
that a defendant is passing off goods in a way that caused a loss of
sales. Instead, courts evaluate how a defendant's conduct affects a
mark's ability to convey information to consumers.25 There is little
doubt, therefore, that the traditional restrictions on relief would bar
most modern trademark actions.
While the common law gave marks very limited protection, that
result was consistent with the pattern of trade that was in place prior
to the Industrial Revolution.2 6 At that time, most consumption came
from self-sufficient agricultural households. To the extent that people
shopped instead of making their own goods, they purchased almost
exclusively from local craftsmen, and the primitive state of
transportation made it almost impossible for consumers to afford
anything that was made in a distant location. As a result, people were
personally acquainted with the manufacturers of their products. They
were the proverbial butcher, baker, and candlestick maker who lived
in the neighborhood. When consumers were deciding whose goods to
buy, therefore, they made an evaluation based on their personal
knowledge of a producer's reputation for quality. A trademark in this
context was a representation by a craftsman that an item was made by
him and that all the weight of his individual reputation was behind it.
The common law limits on trademark infringement made sense
because they were built on this consumer behavior. The direct
competition requirement flowed from the fact that the local
22. See Borden, 201 F. at 513-14; Schechter, supra note 9, at 820-21.
23. See Borden, 201 F. at 513-14; Magliocca, supra note 9, at 971 n.114.
24. See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 350 (9th Cir. 1979). The
more related the competing products are (e.g., guns and bullets as opposed to guns and ice
cream), the more likely it is that a court will find an infringement.
25. See Magliocca, supra note 9, at 954-55; see also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo
Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth the orthodox multi-factor test
for infringement).
26. The analysis and history in the next few paragraphs is drawn from a more
extensive discussion in a prior article of mine. See Magliocca, supra note 9, at 970-74.
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manufacturers that people relied on typically made only one type of
good. So, if someone put a lion on iron and someone else put a lion
on linen, there was no risk of injury because nobody thought that the
same person would make two different items. Consequently, there
was no reason to extend trademark protection beyond a direct
competition scenario. As for the passing off rule, the harm that
troubled a traditional economy was the concrete one that occurred
when someone pretended that his or her goods were from a local
competitor. It made little sense to evaluate the broader impact of
that conduct on the quality of information in the marketplace because
there was no market to evaluate. A market is defined by transactions
where consumers get information through impersonal signals like
prices. In a pre-industrial economy, however, consumers usually
relied on their personal knowledge of producers and engaged in
barter. Thus, unless the use of a trademark actually diverted sales
from one producer to another there was no cause for alarm.
The Industrial Revolution transformed all of this by integrating
scattered rural communities into a single market. This in turn led to
the development of corporations that each made a variety of items
and dissolved the assumption that firms made only a single good.28
More important, these firms took the bulk of production away from
local craftsmen. That change deprived consumers of the personal
relationship with their suppliers that they used to make decisions. In
this new market environment, people came to rely more on
trademarks for information. Although consumers knew little about
the company that a mark represented, they were confident that
products bearing a particular symbol were made by the same source.
Marks became abstract symbols of consistency that told purchasers
that the quality of a good was the same as the quality of what they
had bought before bearing the same mark.2 9
This economic revolution demanded an equivalent shift in
trademark doctrine. Since marks were now divorced from first-hand
knowledge about a producer, "[a] thousand opportunities present[ed]
themselves to the trade-name pirate, of which he c[ould] take
advantage without overstepping the law as laid down in the more
27. See Klieger, supra note 1, at 796; Schechter, supra note 9, at 814.
28. See Lukens, supra note 20, at 204 (stating in 1927 that "[t]he public has become so
accustomed to the idea of dissimilar articles being produced by the same company that it is
hardly surprised at any combination whatever").
29. See, e.g., Sidney A. Diamond, The Public Interest and the Trademark System, 62 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 528, 529 (1980) (stating that buyers now recognize
trademarks as general symbols of quality).
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conservative cases."3 0 Almost anybody could convince consumers
that its products met the quality standard of a blue-chip firm by giving
its brand a similar name. This mischief was not limited to direct
competitors. So long as customers thought that a defendant's goods
could be related to the plaintiff, the use of a similar mark would
create problems.3" In other words, once people understood that firms
made many types of goods, it was easy for them to believe that
someone calling itself "The Tiffany Movie Theater" might be
affiliated with "Tiffany" jewelers. The harm from this conduct was
broader than the mere diversion of sales from one producer to
another. Allowing the unscrupulous to appropriate goodwill through
misleading marks interfered with consumer efforts to obtain
information in the emerging marketplace and threatened economic
growth.
Unfortunately, the courts failed to meet the challenge posed by
these "trademark pirates" and allowed impediments in the market to
multiply. To be fair, the task of reforming trademark doctrine in a
comprehensive fashion was formidable. Moreover, some judges did
recognize the need for change and began moving in the right
direction.3 2 As early as 1917, the Second Circuit held that the direct
competition requirement did not apply when the competing goods
were closely related.33 Other cases held that the infringement test
should examine whether the use of a mark created a likelihood of
consumer confusion and not whether sales were diverted.3 4 Most
courts, however, opposed even these modest changes and adhered
closely to the common-law tradition.
Indeed, infringement would

30. Lukens, supra note 20, at 201.
31. See Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prods., Inc., 264 N.Y.S. 459, 461-62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1932).
32. See Coty, Inc. v. LeBlume Imp. Co., 292 F. 264, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (L. Hand,
J.), affd, 293 F. 344 (2d Cir. 1923) (describing the anonymous source theory of marks);
Walter Baker & Co. v. Slack, 130 F. 514, 518 (7th Cir. 1904) (same).
33. See Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1917)

(holding that an infringement action could be brought in a case involving pancake mix
versus syrup).
34. See Magliocca, supra note 9, at 971; Schechter, supra note 9, at 821 (noting that
some cases had "extended the doctrine of 'unfair competition' beyond cases where there is
an actual 'diversion of custom' ").
35. See, e.g., S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1940)

(limiting infringement actions in non-compete cases to situations (1) where the senior user
was likely to expand into the junior user's market or (2) where the junior user harmed the
senior user's reputation); Lukens, supra note 20, at 204 (stating that conservative courts
stood "in the way of the natural expansion of the law to meet changing economic
conditions").
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not finally break free from its obsolescence until the 1960s.36
The reluctance to expand trademark protection was not just a
matter of inertia. One problem was that many courts simply had a
hard time understanding how unfair competition could occur if the
parties did not directly compete.37

That confusion exemplifies a

formalism that is a particular bugaboo of trademark law. Even
though these actions are equitable in nature, courts sometimes have a
tendency to focus on definitions like "unfair competition" or
"likelihood of confusion" rather than keeping their eye on the
overarching goals of trademark law.38 This behavior defies easy
explanation, but perhaps judges spend so much time crafting a
formula to resolve trademark disputes that they can become
mesmerized by the formula itself and fail to see the pragmatic

consequences of their actions.
Another factor behind the opposition to more trademark
protection was that courts worried about extending the reach of these
state monopolies.39 The most articulate advocate of this concern was
Jerome Frank, who was a leading legal realist before he ascended to
the bench."n Dissenting in Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich,41
Judge Frank emphasized that "the legal protection of trade-names

does not engender competition; on the contrary, it creates lawful
monopolies, immunities from competition."42 He acknowledged that

"[s]ome writers, disturbed by the suggestion that judicially-protected
trade-names are monopolies, protest that the judicial protection of

trade-names rests on prevention of unfairness between competitors,
not on protection of monopoly."43

True to his legal realist roots,

36. See Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph Int'l Corp., 308 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir.
1962). This case adopted the eight Polaroidfactors for infringement. See supra note 12.
37. See Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 F. 510, 514 (7th
Cir. 1912) ("The phrase 'unfair competition' presupposes competition of some sort.");
Brown, supra note 16, at 1192 (calling these courts "distressingly logical"); Lukens, supra
note 20, at 198 (noting that courts often dismissed infringement actions by citing this
maxim).
38. See Lukens, supra note 20, at 197-98; Magliocca, supra note 9, at 954-55.
39. See Fed. Tel. & Radio Corp. v. Fed. Television Corp., 180 F.2d 250, 252 (2d Cir.
1950); 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 24:56 (4th ed. 2000) (explaining that many judges "feared creating a
judge-made 'monopoly' in trademarks").
40. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF
LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 268-75 (1976) (summarizing Frank's philosophy).
41. 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948).
42. Id. at 980 n.13 (Frank, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted); see also
Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., concurring)
(making a similar argument).
43. Triangle, 167 F.2d at 982 (Frank, J., dissenting).
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however, Judge Frank rejected this contention because "[a] concept is
what it does. If a legal concept produces a monopoly, the concept,
pragmatically, is a concept favoring monopoly. Such a concept should
be carefully scrutinized when the courts are asked to widen it.. .. "4
These comments expose the deep division between those who
see trademarks, copyrights, and patents as monopolies and those who
describe them as property. The first view, which dates back to the

Framers of our Constitution, is that these types of instruments were
necessary evils that must be carefully limited to ensure free
competition.4 5
In modern parlance, however, they are usually
characterized as intellectual property that secures the rights of the

creative.'

Of course, there is not much difference between monopoly

and property.

Both are based on the right to exclude.

Property

owners have the right to bar others from using their resources;
monopolists can bar others from competing against them.
The distinction between monopoly and property lies in their

connotations and the willingness of courts to apply them. A
monopoly is treated with skepticism because it is seen as an
unwarranted intrusion into the free market. Property, by contrast, is
lauded because it is viewed as a bundle of rights that supports
Lockean conceptions of freedom. 7 Thus, a lot rides on which labelmonopoly or property-is attached to the interest at stake. 48 It
44. Id. (Frank, J., dissenting).
45. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 246-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (setting
forth the Framers' monopoly view of copyrights and patents); Andrew Jackson, Veto
Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE

PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 584 (James D. Richardson ed., 1899) (declaring the Second
Bank of the United States an unconstitutional monopoly because "[ojn two subjects only
does the Constitution recognize in Congress the power to grant exclusive privileges or
monopolies.... Out of this express delegation of power have grown our laws of patents
and copyrights.").
46. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common
Sense, 108 YALE L. J. 1687-88 (1999) (describing the "fundamental shift" in how courts
and commentators view trademarks); L. Ray Patterson, The DMCA: A Modern Version
of the Licensing Act, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 33, 52-54 (2002) (discussing the ramifications
of proprietary view of copyright).
47. See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 464-65 (1998) (arguing that intellectual
property policy is now dominated by laissez-faire premises of freedom of contract and the
sanctity of private property).
48. Compare R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property
and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1013-14 (2003) (arguing that
the monopoly label is misleading with respect to copyright), with Cohen, supra note 47, at
515 ("[Rleliance on essentialized notions of 'contract,' 'market,' and 'property' elides
important empirical and policy questions about the extent of the monopoly that society
should afford creators .... ").
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should come as no surprise that as the law has moved away from
defining trademarks and copyrights as monopolies, the protection
given to them has steadily increased.4 9
While the view that marks were monopolies inhibited judicial
efforts to adapt trademark law, that sentiment does capture concerns
that should not be dismissed. After all, infringement doctrine does
restrict competition by barring the use of many convenient brand
names. 0 Moreover, robust protection allows firms to turn marks into
advertising powerhouses that give them a substantial advantage that
On the other hand, the
often discourages new competitors.51
information that these marks convey is essential for promoting
competition.
Thus, neither monopoly nor property accurately
describes trademarks. They are unlike monopolies because they
foster competition, but their anticompetitive effects have no
counterpart in real or personal property. Courts and legislatures
must, therefore, disregard these simple labels and weigh the
competing interests to determine the proper level of trademark
protection. More is not always better.
Nevertheless, the balance struck by the common law was clearly
wrong after the Industrial Revolution and the failure of the courts to
do much about it drew increasing criticism from scholars and a few
judges. An academic in the 1920s lamented that "equity will not be
entirely free to enjoin new and unusual forms of trade-name piracy
until the Courts cease to bind themselves by auxiliary tests and begin
freely and directly to apply to these cases the elementary equitable
principle ....
At the same time, another scholar said that "[t]he
proper expansion of trademark law has been hampered by obsolete
49. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112
Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 301-304 (2000)) (extending
the terms for all copyrights); Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98,
109 Stat. 985 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1125, 1127 (2000)) (providing
trademark owners with new remedies in cases of dilution); Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2546 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et. seq. (2000))
(revising Title 17 in its entirety); LITMAN, supra note 2, at 78-81.
50. This is particularly true for descriptive marks, which refer to the traits of the good
in question. See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d
Cir. 1976) (stating the accepted rule that descriptive marks can get protection if they have
secondary meaning); Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759,
772-75 (1990) (explaining the costs created by prohibiting parties from using these terms).
51. See Brown, supra note 16, at 1187 (stating that a mark "is a narrow bridge over
which all the traffic powered by [product] advertising must pass.... With time, the
symbol comes to be more than a conduit through which the persuasive power of
advertising is transmitted, and acquires a potency, a 'commercial magnetism,' of its
own.").

52. Lukens, supra note 20, at 205.
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conceptions both as to the function of a trademark and as to the need

for its protection."53 Even in the 1950s, reform-minded judges like
Charles Clark were still arguing that many plaintiffs "had the
misfortune-so it seems to me-to come before a panel of this court
allergic to the doctrine ... of protecting trade names against
competition which will create confusion . . . . ,14 This continuing
intransigence was the overture that ushered in the more drastic

solutions waiting in the wings.
B.

Three RadicalResponses to Gridlock

Growing frustration with the pace of change eventually led some
to abandon evolutionary reform in favor of new frameworks that
could replace the common law. Two of these alternatives were
developed by scholars and one by the Supreme Court. But all three

were united by their radicalism in creating robust property rights that
would provide ample, and in many eyes excessive, protection for

trademark interests.55 This Section reveals the common ancestry of
misappropriation, dilution, and the right of publicity before exploring
the mixed reception these satellite doctrines initially received from
the legal establishment.

1. Misappropriation
Most challenges to orthodox legal thought begin-and end-in
academic circles, but the first broad attack on the obsolescence of
trademark doctrine came from the Supreme Court in International
News Service v. Associated Press.56 That case involved two competing

wire services-the International News Service ("INS") and the
Associated Press ("AP")-that gathered news and distributed stories
to papers around the country.57 AP's articles were issued as public

53. Schechter, supra note 9, at 824; accord Lukens, supra note 20, at 204 (noting that
the relationship test is used by courts as a strict rule of law rather than as a rule of thumb
to guide decision making).
54. Hyde Park Clothes, Inc. v. Hyde Park Fashions, Inc., 204 F.2d 223, 226 (2d Cir.
1953) (Clark, J.,dissenting); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, § 24:56 (explaining that Judge
Clark took a broad view of unfair competition protection).
55. See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 242 (1918) (creating the
misappropriation doctrine); Nimmer, supra note 13, at 204 (addressing the right of
publicity); Schechter, supra note 9, at 830-32 (developing dilution); see also Brown, supra
note 16, at 1191-1201 (laying out a broad critique of dilution and misappropriation);
Madow, supra note 14, at 228-38 (arguing that publicity rights are unnecessary to protect
trademark interests).
56. Int'l News, 248 U.S. at 215.
57. See id. at 229-30.
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bulletins and then transmitted to its subscribers.58 Sensing an
opportunity, INS began copying AP stories from these public bulletin
boards and from early editions of East Coast papers.5 9 INS then sent
these articles or thinly disguised copies to its papers before the other
Though the AP was
AP publications could get them.'
understandably upset by this practice, the news in its articles was not
copyrightable and hence the only possible avenue of relief was unfair
competition doctrine.6
The problem for the AP, however, was that the common law
required a showing that INS was passing off its stories. This was an
element that the plaintiff could not meet because INS presented the
purloined articles as the news without referring to the AP.62 Yet the
Justices recognized that the conduct of INS was troubling because it
occurred "precisely at the point where the profit is to be
reaped.., with special advantage to defendant in the competition
because of the fact that it is not burdened with any part of the
expense of gathering the news."63 That is the dilemma posed by
intellectual property; it is costly to produce but easy to copy. News
gathering fit this paradigm well, but trademark law offered no
protection because of its antiquated premises. 4
There was an incremental solution that would have allowed the
Court to give the AP relief and nudge the law in the right direction.
In a separate opinion, Justice Holmes observed that "[t]he ordinary
case ... is palming off the defendant's products as the plaintiff's but
the same evil may follow from the opposite falsehood-from saying
whether in words or by implication that the plaintiff's product is the
defendant's, and that, it seems to me, is what has happened here."65
Put another way, the issue was whether INS was interfering with the
information conveyed by the AP byline and thereby misleading
people who read AP articles into thinking that they were from INS.
Holmes said that this "falsehood is a little more subtle, the injury, a

58. See id. at 231.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 232-33; id. at 234-35 ("We need spend no time, however, upon the
general question of property in news matter at common law, or the application of the
copyright act, since it seems to us the case must turn upon the question of unfair
competition in business.").
62. See id. at 239; id. at 247 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 240.
64. Even progressives like Justice Brandeis were unwilling to revise the obsolete
dissenting).
common law rules. See id. at 259-61 (Brandeis, J.,
65. Id. at 247 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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little more indirect, than in ordinary cases of unfair trade, but I think
that the principle that condemns the one condemns the other."66 In
keeping with this modest doctrinal adjustment, Holmes also
suggested a narrow remedy that would allow INS to copy AP stories
so long as INS gave "express credit to the Associated Press."67
Rather than accept Holmes's evolutionary approach, the
majority dealt with the crisis in trademark law by inventing a new
property right through misappropriation.6" The Court agreed that the
passing off rule was obsolete,69 but gave the AP relief based on the
broad principle that "he who has fairly paid the price should have the
beneficial use of the property."7 The Justices acknowledged that
news was not property, but held that "if that which complainant has
acquired fairly at substantial cost may be sold fairly at substantial
profit, a competitor who is misappropriating it for the purpose of
disposing of it to his own profit ... cannot be heard to say that it is
too ...

evanescent to be regarded as property."'"

Under these

circumstances, a resource "has all the attributes of property necessary
for determining that a misappropriation of it by a competitor is unfair
72
competition because [it is] contrary to good conscience.
This holding threatened to overthrow the entire structure of
copyright, trademark, and patent law. In essence, the Court was
saying that information not deemed property by Congress or by
tradition could nonetheless be treated as property by a court. That
would have made courts, rather than legislatures, the ultimate
arbiters of what should receive property protection.73 Beyond this
process issue, the Court's declaration that anything valuable could not
be copied and sold reversed the conventional view that the ownership
of information should be limited. As Ralph S. Brown has noted,
66. Id.

This concept of "reverse confusion" is now well-established in infringement

doctrine. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041, 2044-45
& n.1 (2003); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, at § 10:49.
67. See Int'l News, 248 U.S. at 248 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
68. See id. at 242. In fairness, some of the Court's language supported Holmes's
position, but the majority ruled that the theory of relief should be much broader.
69. See id. at 241-42 (stating that "the elements of unfair competition are lacking
because there is no attempt by defendant to palm off its goods .... But we cannot
concede that the right to equitable relief is confined to that class of cases." (citation
omitted)).
70. Id. at 240.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. As Julie E. Cohen points out, the decision in InternationalNews is not so startling
when one considers that during this time the Supreme Court was in the thrall of a
substantive due process theory focused on liberty of contract. See Cohen, supranote 47, at
507-08.
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misappropriation's "gross fallacy is the assumption of a general policy
in favor of monopolies in ideas, systems, or any ingenious
74
contrivance."
Many commentators, like Professor Brown, were sharply critical
of the broad doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court. Leading the
charge was Judge Learned Hand, who in 1929 rejected a claim
brought by a fashion house seeking to protect its designs from
copiers.7 ' After noting that clothing designs were not covered by the
design patent or copyright statutes, Hand declined the plaintiff's
invitation to use misappropriation.76 In that most cutting of legal
insults, he said that InternationalNews should be confined to its facts,
explaining that "[w]hile it is of course true that law ordinarily speaks
in general terms .... [wie think that no more was covered [in that
case] than situations substantially similar to those then at bar. The
difficulties of understanding it otherwise are insuperable. 7 7 Hand
could not believe that "the Court meant to create a sort of commonlaw patent or copyright for reasons of justice. Either would flagrantly
conflict with the scheme which Congress has for more than a century
78
devised to cover the subject-matter.
While the implications of misappropriation were troubling, there
was one virtue in this blunt weapon-it could eliminate the obsolete
limits on trademark protection. Of course, a sledgehammer can kill
bugs; but that doesn't mean using one is a good idea. Nevertheless,
some judges faced with a stark choice between archaic trademark law
and a theory that would let them extend protection where it was
sorely needed were willing to overlook the flaws of misappropriation
and use it to grant relief.79 The question was whether this desperation
would gather momentum and overwhelm the common law.
2. Dilution
The

next

radical candidate

to replace

traditional

unfair

74. Brown, supra note 16, at 1200.
75. See Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929).
76. See id. at 279-80. For more on the dilemma posed by the protection of aesthetic
designs, see Gerard N. Magliocca, Ornamental Design and Incremental Innovation, 86
MARQ. L. REV. 845,850-61 (2003).

77. Cheney Bros., 35 F.2d at 280.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 492
(W.D. Pa. 1938); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 101
N.Y.S.2d 483, 489 (Sup. Ct. 1950), affd, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App. Div. 1951) (per curiam);
see also Keller, supra note 14, at 408-11 (explaining that some courts turned to
misappropriation as "a practical necessity").

2004]

TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT

1025

competition law was trademark dilution, which came from a proposal
by Frank I. Schechter."' He was the scholar who did more than
anyone else to explain how the Industrial Revolution altered the role
of trademarks.8 1 To deal with these new realities, Schechter initially
supported gradual reform of the infringement test.82 By 1927,
however, he joined the disgruntled camp and concluded
that the
83
common law was probably incapable of reforming itself.
Like misappropriation, dilution began with the premise that
trademark doctrine was obsolete. While misappropriation was a
response to the passing off requirement, dilution focused on the
direct competition rule. Schechter argued that "the creation and
retention of custom, rather than the designation of source, is the
primary purpose of the trademark today .... ."I As a result, "[t]he
use of similar marks on non-competing goods is perhaps the normal
rather than the exceptional case of infringement."8 5 He concluded
from this premise that the traditional notion that different firms could
stamp lions on iron and linen was "archaic." 8 6
Dilution broke with the common law and misappropriation in its
assertion that the way to modernize trademark protection was by
redefining the harm caused by the use of another's mark. Schechter
thought that courts should look at how a defendant's conduct affected
a mark's advertising power rather than examining its direct impact on
consumers. 87 Thus, he said that "[t]he real injury in all such
cases ... is the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity
and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use on noncompeting goods. 88 This was so because a mark's advertising power
depended on "its uniqueness and singularity" and whether "such
uniqueness or singularity is vitiated or impaired by its use upon either

80. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
81. See FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW
RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 129-34 (1925); Klieger, supra note 1, at 801; see also
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170
F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1999) (commenting on Schechter's role).
82. See Rirgling Bros., 170 F.3d at 454; SCHECHTER, supra note 81, at 164-71;
Magiiocca, supra note 9, at 974-75.
83. I say "probably" because there is language in Schechter's article indicating that he
saw some hope for infringement, which turned out to be prophetic. See Schechter, supra
note 9, at 826.
84. Id. at 822.
85. Id. at 825.
86. See id. at 822-23.
87. See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 454; Schechter, supra note 9, at 830-31.
88. Schechter, supra note 9, at 825. This is a subtle point that the Supreme Court
misunderstood in the Moseley case. See infra note 151.
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related or non-related goods. 89
Schechter's conclusion that "the preservation of the uniqueness
of a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its
protection" was an elegant solution to the common law's
obsolescence. 90 In a single stroke, dilution broadened trademark
protection by permitting courts to bar almost any use of a mark that
was similar to another. Under this approach, it did not matter
whether a use was by a non-competitor or involved passing off since
either could disturb the uniqueness of a mark. Notwithstanding its
tremendous sweep, dilution was at least narrower than
misappropriation. While misappropriation could be applied to any
form of intellectual property, dilution was a doctrine limited to
trademarks.
Schechter sought to restrict dilution further by
suggesting that it should apply only to well-known marks.91
Nevertheless, the common law's defenders still condemned
dilution for being too broad. 92 The problem was that Schechter
reacted to the restrictions on trademark doctrine by wiping out
almost all limits on protection.93 Indeed, there is virtually no
difference between dilution and misappropriation as applied to
marks. 94 Both allow judges to exercise unfettered discretion in
determining what could be copied. Both rest on the dubious
assumption that more protection is always better.
As with misappropriation, some courts embraced the dilution
model as the only remedy for trademark obsolescence." Indeed, the
flaws in infringement doctrine were so serious by the 1940s that
dilution actually started getting enacted into law. Massachusetts led
the way in 1947 and was soon followed by New York, Illinois, and

89. Schechter, supra note 9, at 831.

90. Id.
91. See id. at 828-30.
92. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 16, at 1191-1201 (calling dilution "[tihe clearest, most
candid, and most far-reaching claim on behalf of persuasive values").
93. For a detailed discussion on the flaws of the original dilution proposal, see
Magliocca, supra note 9, at 977-82.
94. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, § 10:72 ("While there neither is nor should be
such a thing as 'misappropriation' of a trademark, the closest concept that in fact exists in
the law is the theory of 'dilution' of a mark.").
95. See, e.g., Stork Rest., Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 356-64 (9th Cir. 1948) (granting
an injunction to a New York nightclub against a San Francisco club using the same name
based on the confusion causing a "dilution of goodwill" earned by the plaintiff);
Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 296 N.Y.S. 176, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937)
(stating that without dilution protection, "[tihe normal potential expansion of plaintiff's
business may be forestalled"); Magliocca, supra note 9, at 994-98 (putting these and other
dilution cases and the commentary on them in a broader context).
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Georgia.9 6 These state dilution statutes went well beyond Schechter's

proposal in that they applied to most marks rather than just wellknown ones.97 By taking these actions, legislators were signaling that
their patience with the common law was running out.
3. Right of Publicity
The final doctrine to emerge from trademark infringement's
shadow was the right of publicity, which was largely the brainchild of
Professor Melville B. Nimmer.98
Unlike misappropriation and
dilution, which were comprehensive reform proposals, the right of
publicity focused on one concrete interest that needed enhanced
protection-the commercial value of celebrity personalities.99 Thus,

the publicity right was more modest in scope than its counterparts but
still related to them because the common law's obsolescence was also
the chief obstacle for famous people seeking to capitalize on their

renown.
a.

The Changing Nature of Celebrity

As fame presents issues that were not covered in the prior
discussion, some background is necessary on how the common law
treated celebrities. The headline is that until recent years, virtually
anyone could slap a famous person's name or likeness on goods
without that celebrity's consent." A stroll through history reveals
many examples of this opportunistic commerce, such as Benjamin
Franklin handkerchiefs, Sarah Bernhardt candy, John Brown
lithographs, and Oscar Wilde trading cards. 10 1 At common law, these
items did not infringe a mark because the firms selling them were not
96. See Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 307, § 7a, 1947 Mass. Acts 300, 307 (codified as
amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. ll0B, § 12 (West 1999)) ("Likelihood of injury
to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of [a trade name or trademark] shall be a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition
between the parties or of confusion as to the source of goods or services."); Klieger, supra
note 1, at 812.
97. See Magliocca, supra note 9, at 999. On the other hand, these laws replaced
Schechter's uniqueness test with a "likelihood of dilution" standard that sounds narrower
but eludes definition. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 455-56 (4th Cir. 1999).
98. See Nimmer, supra note 13, at 203; see also Madow, supra note 14, at 174
(describing Nimmer's article as seminal in the development of publicity rights).
99. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir.
1983) (stating that the celebrity has a "protected pecuniary interest in the commercial
exploitation of his identity"); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian
Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383,392 (1999).
100. See Madow, supra note 14, at 148-53.
101. See id. at 149-52.
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direct competitors of the famous. But the development of a market
economy challenged this facet of the direct competition rule by
allowing celebrities to endorse products. Just as a mark conveys
quality information to consumers, so a famous person's endorsement
puts a seal of approval on a brand. Permitting unauthorized uses of
someone's name or likeness interferes with that quality-identifying
function by muddying the message that the person's reputation is
intended to send. Thus, the law needed to protect famous personas as
much as other marks.
The common law's refusal to safeguard this interest was
particularly problematic because the Industrial Revolution created
scores of new celebrities. Before the rise of mass media, very few
people were famous. This may be difficult to imagine, but back then
there was almost no way to become acquainted with people outside of
the local community. Indeed, one scholar notes "that most of the first
fifteen presidents of the United States would not have been
recognized had they passed the average citizen on the street." 10 2 By
contrast, our lives are now saturated with images of the famous.
Moreover, the growth of electronic media has expanded the celebrity
population further by ensuring that famous people of the past will not
go away. For instance, although Marilyn Monroe has been dead for
decades, she remains a potent advertising symbol because anyone can
watch a video and see her looking as good as new. The explosion in
the number of celebrities and in the revenue that could be earned by
exploiting fame posed a growing risk to a marketplace that depended,
in part, on the information conveyed by endorsements. 103
The mass media did more than spur the growth of celebrity; it
had a keen interest in making as many people as famous as possible.
Hollywood wants celebrities because they sell tickets and attract
ratings. News outlets, which are often hard to distinguish from
entertainment, also need famous figures to sell papers and garner
viewers. But the problem is that there are rarely enough celebrities
making news to fill all of the available pages or television air time.
The solution was explained by Orson Welles in his portrayal of news
magnate Charles Foster Kane in Citizen Kane. Upon being told that
a story was not big news, Kane replied, "If the headline is big enough,

102.

NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE

AGE OF SHOW BUSINESS 60 (1985).

103. This is in sharp contrast to the pre-industrial era, where there were so few
celebrities that allowing unauthorized uses of their likenesses probably had little impact on
the market as a whole.
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that makes the news big enough. ' '1°4 In other words, the media
guarantees a sufficient supply of news by lowering the standard of
notoriety and thereby creating more celebrities.
In sum, two factors shaped the right of publicity. One was the
negative impact that the unrestricted use of fame had on the quality
of information in the marketplace, which was analogous to the
broader concern facing trademark law after the Industrial
Revolution. The other was a property incentive that spoke directly to
the creative needs of the entertainment industry. 1 5 Unfortunately,
the common law protected neither of these interests. This failure
soon provoked a response.
b.

Nimmer and the Legal Reaction

In 1953, the Second Circuit suggested that the impasse could be
resolved by giving celebrities a broad property right under state law
over the commercial use of their likeness. 10 6 When a baseball player's
picture was used by a trading card company without his consent, the
court responded that "[a] man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of
publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be made 'in
gross', i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or
anything else."'0 7 This conclusion, which was reached with little
explanation, was radical because it put endorsements'on a different
plane from other trademarks. Marks are not in gross property rights;
they are limited entitlements that secure competition. 108 By contrast,
the court's rule covered all commercial uses of a celebrity persona
and went beyond what was necessary to protect the integrity of the

104. CITIZEN KANE (RKO Studios 1941).
105. Granted, corporations also have a property interest in their marks that has
influenced the growth of dilution. See infra text accompanying notes 137-38. The reason
for dwelling on the property aspect of publicity rights is that it has consequences for
copyright law. See infra text accompanying notes 211-13.
106. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gurh, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.

1953).
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 414 (1916) (stating
that "the trade-mark is treated as merely a protection for the good will, and not the

subject of property except in connection with an existing business"); Cardtoons, L.C. v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 967-68 (10th Cir. 1996) (describing the
distinction between publicity rights and the protection afforded against false
endorsement); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir.
1959) (explaining the settled rule that marks, unlike gross property, may not be freely

licensed).
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One year later, Melville Nimmer put flesh on this idea in an
influential article entitled The Right of Publicity.110 His analysis
began with the same lament that animated misappropriation and
dilution-the common law was "not adequate to meet the demands of

the second half of the twentieth century, particularly with respect to
the advertising, motion picture, and television, and radio
industries.""' In a masterful review of the trademark precedents,

Nimmer showed how the direct competition rule barred relief in most
publicity cases." 2 He also pointed out that the passing off element
was still a substantial impediment for famous plaintiffs." 3 While
conceding that by the 1950s there was "a marked tendency in a

number of jurisdictions to take a broader view of the scope of unfair
competition," Nimmer evidently concluded that the reform of
trademark infringement had not gone far enough." 4
Instead, the professor argued for the creation of a right of
publicity defined as "the right of each person to control and profit
from the publicity values which he has created.""' 5 Nimmer's major
premise was that fame was the result of individual skill and hard
work." 6 His minor premise was that "every person is entitled to the
fruit of his labors unless there are important countervailing public
policy considerations.""' 7 Having shifted the burden of persuasion to
109. A fascinating and overlooked aspect of the Haelan opinion is that it was written
by Judge Frank, the great foe of trademark expansion, and joined by Judge Clark, the
great proponent of broadening infringement. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44,
54. This unlikely alliance was a signal that the right of publicity was a compromise
doctrine that could hold broad support.
110. See Nimmer, supra note 13, at 203; see also Madow, supra note 14, at 174 n.235
(explaining that most of Nimmer's proposals were adopted).
111. Nimmer, supra note 13, at 203. This quote focused on the inadequacy of the right
of privacy, but Nimmer was equally dismissive of that concept and of unfair competition
law. For the full analysis of these points, see id. at 204-14. It should be noted that his
views about protecting the entertainment industry were undoubtedly influenced by his
role as counsel for Paramount. See id. at 203 n.*.
112. See id. at 210-11 (citing Vassar Coll. v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982 (W.D.
Mo. 1912)); see also Loeb v. Turner, 257 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (holding
that a radio station in Phoenix, Arizona is not in direct competition with a radio station in
Dallas, Texas).
113. See Nimmer, supra note 13, at 212; id. at 216 (stating that the publicity right
"should exist (unlike unfair competition) regardless of whether the defendant is in
competition with the plaintiff, and regardless of whether he is passing off his own products
as those of the plaintiff").
114. Id. at 213.
115. Id. at 216.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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the opponents of a right of publicity, Nimmer quickly dismissed any
remaining objections and moved on to outline the right's
parameters.118 Since this proposal was made in the twilight of
trademark's obsolescence, the substantive discussion about publicity
rights will be postponed until the next section.119
One aspect of Nimmer's article that is worth mentioning here,
however, is its contention that a publicity right was justified because it
could address aspects of the common law's obsolescence "without
After discussing
going to the extremes" of misappropriation. 120
InternationalNews and a few related cases, Nimmer observed that
"publicity values might be protected under such a broad theory, but
in doing so the courts would be adopting a standard which by its
uncertainty could prove highly detrimental to orderly commercial
intercourse."12' 1 This was a powerful insight about misappropriation
that supporters of gradual trademark reform could have just as easily
applied to dilution or to the right of publicity itself. While all three of
these concepts offered relief from the common law's obsolescence,
they also carried significant costs that would be exposed once the
crisis in infringement ended.
C. Rebels Without a Cause
After decades of struggle, in the 1960s judges finally began to
apply a new multi-factor infringement test that looked broadly at how
a defendant's conduct affected a mark's ability to convey
information.1 2
The development of this likelihood of consumer
confusion standard was a triumph for traditional legal methods and
brought the law into line with reality. Yet once infringement doctrine
adapted itself to post-industrial economic reality, misappropriation,
dilution, and the right of publicity all rested on shaky ground. This
Section discusses how those concepts fared after the 1960s and shows

118. See id. at 216-18.
119. See infra text accompanying notes 159-73.
120. See Nimmer, supra note 13, at 214.
121. Id. On the other hand, Nimmer did cite some misappropriation cases as support
for a publicity right by claiming that they could be narrowly construed as dealing with
fame issues. See id. at 219-20.
122. See, e.g., Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph Int'l Corp., 308 F.2d 196, 198 (2d
Cir. 1962) (listing the eight infringement factors as (1) the strength of the senior mark; (2)
the degree of similarity between the competing marks; (3) the proximity of the products;
(4) actual confusion; (5) the likelihood that the senior user would bridge the gap; (6) the
defendant's good faith or lack thereof; (7) the quality of the defendant's goods; and (8) the
sophistication of consumers). For a description of the long process that led to this multifactor solution, see generally Magliocca, supra note 9, at 994-1005.
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that one of them atrophied while the other two grew in stature. Then
the analysis attempts to explain why certain satellite doctrines
flourish while others fail.

1. The Sunset of Misappropriation
The first and most sweeping of the reform proposals was also the
least successful at finding a new audience. Out of respect for the
Supreme Court's holding in InternationalNews, judges presented with

misappropriation claims are careful to say that the doctrine remains
viable.'23 Since trademark infringement reformed itself, however, few
courts have granted relief based on this ground.124 As a result,

misappropriation has largely become the backwater in intellectual
property law that Learned Hand wanted.'2 5

One explanation for the failure of misappropriation relates to the
legal process objections that were made against InternationalNews at

the outset.

In recent decades, the Supreme Court has taken the

strong position that Congress should define the scope of intellectual
property. 1 6
Obviously, this line of cases is in tension with
misappropriation's role as an equitable doctrine designed to overrule

a congressional judgment not to grant property protection.
Furthermore, Congress asserted its own authority in the 1976
Copyright Act, which contained a broad preemption clause that
further limited misappropriation.'2 7 In the end, misappropriation's
advocates have never persuasively explained why courts should be

123. See, e.g., NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that
InternationalNews survives Copyright Act preemption only in cases closely similar to its
facts).
124. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, § 10:53 ("[D]uring the 1918-1964 era, there was
a basic divergence of opinion among the courts as to the propriety of the misappropriation
doctrine."); Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of
International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 421-23 (1983)
(noting few successful invocations of misappropriation since the 1960s and describing
subsequent citations of InternationalNews as "simply a rhetorical flourish"); Keller, supra
note 14, at 402 (noting that since the 1918-1964 era, misappropriation has lost its vitality).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
126. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) (affirming Congress's
plenary authority over copyrights); Bonito Boats Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 165-68 (1989) (holding that a state statute protecting yacht hull designs was
preempted by the federal patent laws); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
231 (1964) (announcing a broad doctrine of preemption).
127. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000). Remember that InternationalNews was decided
before Erie deprived federal courts of their general common law power. See Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Thus, the misappropriation doctrine can now be
applied only pursuant to state law.
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128
able to give information protection when legislatures have not.
Furthermore, the InternationalNews opinion was terribly vague
about how courts should determine when this extraordinary relief was
warranted. Nine decades later, misappropriation law still resists all
efforts to extract a clear principle that can guide judicial decisions. Of
course, this is what made the doctrine so effective at dealing with
trademark obsolescence-it gave courts broad discretion to extend
property protection when it seemed necessary. But once that need
was filled by other means, Nimmer's and Judge Hand's pointed
129
criticism of misappropriation became the conventional wisdom.

2. The Twists and Turns of Dilution
The path taken by dilution presents a more complex picture.
Unlike misappropriation, dilution did not disappear after the 1960s.
Instead, Schechter's model became a respectable doctrine that is now
a powerful alternative to the traditional model of trademark
protection. 30 After exploring dilution's evolution through the 1990s,
this Section concludes by offering some comments on the Supreme
Court's recent opinion in Moseley.
a.

The Prologue

In most courts, dilution initially followed misappropriation into
Now that judges were more concerned about the
oblivion.
extraordinary breadth of the theory rather than its benefits in fighting
trademark obsolescence, they began finding creative ways to restrict
dilution laws."' In particular, many courts held, in clear violation of
statutory text, that dilution required a showing of likely consumer
confusion that was exactly like the new infringement test.132 This
rendered dilution irrelevant by erasing the distinction between
128. The only plausible explanation is the same one that motivated the creation of
misappropriation in the first place; namely, that statutes regulating copyrights or patents
are obsolete and need to be updated. While this might be valid in a few extreme
situations, it does not provide a general justification for usurping the legislature's
authority.
129. See supra notes 75-78, 120-21 and accompanying text.
130. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. b (1995)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; Klieger, supra note 1, at 865.

131. See Klieger, supra note 1, at 818-19; Magliocca, supra note 9, at 1005-06; Beverly
W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, Its
Progress and Prospects,71 Nw. U. L. REV. 618, 624 (1976).

132. See, e.g., Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 243 F.2d 540, 544, 546 (1st Cir.
1957); Cue Publ'g Co., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 256 N.Y.S.2d 239, 246 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1965); Note, Dilution: Trademark Infringement or Will-o'-the-Wisp?, 77 HARV. L. REV.

520, 527 (1964).
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Schechter's proposal, which sought to extend protection even when a
likelihood of confusion was not present, and the protection offered by
mainstream trademark law.
This rout in the courts, however, was mitigated by two
countervailing trends. First, state legislatures kept enacting dilution
statutes, a process that continued until at least half of the states had
such a law by 1995.133 Second, there were some cases that used
dilution to stop "tarnishment" that occurred when someone produced
shoddy or unwholesome goods and used a mark that was similar to a
firm with an impeccable reputation.'34 Some judges ruled that this
injured the plaintiff's mark yet was distinct from infringement. 35
Taking the legislative actions first, there is no doubt that mark
owners continued to fight for dilution because it offered them more
property rights than infringement ever could.
Moreover, this
powerful interest group could rely on Schechter's theory to justify its
lobbying on principled grounds. 13 6 While that private motive may
have fueled some of the new laws, a more important factor has been
the tendency in recent years to view information controls more as
property than as monopolies.'37 Dilution resonates with this shift in
sentiment because it places more emphasis on safeguarding the
investments in marks by their owners than on protecting consumers
and hence looks more like a property concept. While legislators in
the thrall of the property label may have found dilution appealing,
judges interpreting these statutes were still somewhat imbued with
the traditional idea that marks were monopolies.'3 8
As for the tarnishment cases, they represent the perils of
formalism in trademark and dilution's role as a transitional solution.
When someone uses another's mark and makes something sleazy, this
133. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 430 (2003).
134. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994) (defining
tarnishment); see also, e.g., Cmty. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Orondorff, 678 F.2d 1034
(11th Cir. 1982) (allowing plaintiff tarnishment relief under an anti-dilution statute);
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1040
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding that the manufacturer of "Cabbage Patch Kids" will likely
prevail in a dilution claim against "Garbage Pail Kids" because sufficient evidence of
tarnishment exists); Gucci Shops, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 446 F. Supp. 838, 841
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (granting a preliminary injunction to prevent the manufacturer of
"Gucchi Goo" diaper bags from damaging Gucci's business reputation).
135. See Chem. Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433, 437 (5th Cir.
1962); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
136. See Klieger, supra note 1, at 813 (describing the United States Trademark
Association's active support for dilution).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
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interferes with a mark's ability to convey information because some
people will associate the mark with the sleaze. This harm does not fit
comfortably within the likelihood of confusion standard, however,
because people are less likely to be confused if the reputations of the
competing products are highly dissimilar.139 For instance, few would
believe that a staid company like IBM could be affiliated with
pornography even if there was a topless bar called "The IBM Palace."

People would be more confused if a maker of reputable goods, such
as auto parts, called itself IBN or IPM. Thus, courts reading the
likelihood of confusion formula literally might have trouble calling
"The IBM Palace" trademark infringement. 4 ° While Schechter said

nothing about tarnishment, dilution allowed courts in these situations
141
to grant relief because the theory was so broad.
Despite these twitches of life, dilution remained a marginal

player in unfair competition until the rise of the Internet in the 1990s.
Once again, an upheaval in technology left infringement doctrine
outdated, though not to the same extent as was the case immediately
after the Industrial Revolution. Mainstream trademark doctrine had

no answer when "cybersquatters" took over domain names that were
similar to existing marks and tried to sell the names back to the mark
owners at a substantial premium. 142
The problem was that
infringement law assumed that relief could be granted only if a
defendant sold tangible goods or services.
Allowing people other
than mark owners to take affiliated domain names, however,

significantly impeded consumer efforts to find those firms on the
Internet. To protect the important retail location information that
these marks conveyed, some courts turned to dilution and ruled that
cybersquatting undermined the marks' uniqueness and, in Schechter's

139. See Magliocca, supra note 9, at 1000-02.
140. Nevertheless, some people would think that the shady product was related to the
blue-chip firm, and for them the injury to the latter's reputation is great. The overall harm
is just as serious as in the situation where many people are confused and the disparity in
reputations is small. See id. at 1002 (explaining that "the protection of the mark's quality
function is best viewed along a continuum embracing two factors: potential source
confusion and reputational injury").
141. There is a complex causal link between the birth of tarnishment and the reform of
trademark infringement. See generally id. at 1008-14 (describing this causal link).
142. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324-27 (9th Cir. 1998)
(holding that plaintiff's marks were diluted when defendant registered them as his Internet
domain names).
Eventually, Congress passed a specific statute to deal with
cybersquatting. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-545 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000)).
143. See Magliocca, supra note 9, at 1028-29.
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parlance, whittled their value.'" Just as dilution was finding this new
role in the courts, Congress gave the doctrine a huge boost in 1995 by
passing the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA") to protect
"famous" marks. 4 5 The creation of a national dilution remedy was
certainly a response to years of lobbying by mark owners, but its
passage at a time when the Internet was creating problems for
infringement may not have been a coincidence. 46 In any event, with
the passage of the FTDA, dilution at last gained mainstream
acceptance.
The difficulty with the FTDA, as with dilution more generally, is
that courts have a hard time explaining what a plaintiff must show to
get relief. Put another way, dilution's extraordinary breadth makes it
tricky to apply short of saying that all similar uses of a particular mark
are barred. Some circuits took a narrow approach and held that only
a showing of actual harm to the advertising power of a mark, such as
lost sales or profits, warranted relief.147 Other circuits held that
plaintiffs need only show a "likelihood of dilution" and used the
multi-factor infringement test to guide their analysis. 4 This sharp
division in authority was the backdrop for the Supreme Court's
opinion in Moseley.
b.

Moseley

Moseley squarely presented a fundamental issue raised by this
Article: How should a satellite doctrine developed under crisis
conditions be integrated into a more stable legal landscape? The
Court's answer to this question was something of an anticlimax.
While the Moseley opinion is somewhat cryptic, the judgment does
lay a solid foundation for bringing dilution into harmony with the rest
of unfair competition law.
The Justices' first encounter with dilution was a David and
144. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1326-27; Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282,
305-08 (D.N.J. 1998).

145. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98 § 3, 109 Stat. 985,
985 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)). The FTDA provides, in
pertinent part, that the plaintiff is entitled to relief if the unauthorized use "causes dilution
of the distinctive quality" of a famous mark. Id.
146. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 430 (2003) (documenting
the legislative history); Klieger, supra note 1, at 838-39 (describing corporate support for
the FTDA).
147. See Westchester Media, L.L.C. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670 (5th
Cir. 2000); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464-65 (4th Cir. 1999).
148. See Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157,
168-69 (3d Cir. 2000); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Goliath tale. The plaintiff was Victoria's Secret, the lingerie firm, and

the defendant was a novelty and sex toy shop in a Kentucky strip mall
called "Victor's Little Secret."14' 9 In its dilution action, the plaintiff
offered no evidence that defendant's mark harmed the advertising

power of Victoria's Secret. The Sixth Circuit analyzed the case under
a likelihood of dilution test, however, and after examining the
contextual factors, held that defendant tarnished and "blurred"

plaintiff's mark, employing the term of art used for Schechter's
whittling concept. 150
The Supreme Court reversed in a brief opinion holding that the
FTDA requires a showing of actual harm. 5' That conclusion was
reached over the objections of dilution supporters, who argued that
evidence of actual harm "may be difficult to obtain" because
''consumer surveys and other means of demonstrating actual dilution
are expensive and often unreliable."''
While responding that this
was "not an acceptable reason for dispensing with proof of an
essential element of a statutory violation," the Court did say that
meeting the actual harm standard did not require evidence of lost
sales or profits."5 3 But the Court did not take the next step and
149. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422.
150. See id. at 425-26; Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994)
(defining blurring as "the whittling away of an established trademark's selling power
through its unauthorized use by others upon dissimilar products"). I leave it to the reader
to decide whether a risqu6 lingerie firm can really be tarnished by another sex-oriented
product.
151. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34. While this conclusion was sound, see infra text
accompanying notes 155-58, some of the Court's dicta was troubling. First, the Justices
incorrectly stated that dilution is "not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers."
Moseley, 537 U.S. at 429. Dilution was designed to protect consumers by expanding
trademark protection. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text. Although the
means Schechter chose focused on the advertising power of marks, his goal was no
different from traditional trademark law.
Next, the Court erred in suggesting that the FTDA does not cover tarnishment.
See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34. Not only was that harm mentioned in the legislative
history, but the statute's definition of dilution-"the lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services"-is so broad that it encompasses
practically anything. Id. at 421; see also id. at 431 (stating that the purpose of the FTDA
"is to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the
mark or tarnish or disparage it" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1029)). The Court's assertion relied on the fact that state
dilution laws drew a distinction between "dilution" and "injury to business reputation."
See id. at 432. Assuming that the latter phrase referred to tarnishment, the Justices noted
the absence of similar language in the FTDA. See id. This analysis, however, ignores the
sweeping language that Congress used to define dilution, which is broader than the
"dilution" text in the state statutes. See id. at 432-33.
152. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
153. Id.; see also id. at 433 (disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit's contrary suggestion in
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explain what proof was necessary to show actual harm or how the
lower courts should analyze whether actual harm occurs. 15 4 This

silence has left the trademark bar, and most of the federal judiciary,
in a quandary over how to deal with future dilution cases.

Nevertheless, the judgment in Moseley coheres with the broad
themes underlying dilution's origin as a satellite doctrine and can be
used to construct a sensible test. To achieve this goal, courts must

resist the temptation to develop a multi-factor formula for dilution
that apes infringement analysis. Dilution cannot be approached in
this way because the doctrine is best understood as "the transitional
law of trademark" that fills temporary gaps in mainstream
protection.'55 Thus, courts presented with a dilution action should ask

whether the defendant's conduct impairs a mark's ability to convey
information to consumers in a way that is not already covered by
infringement.15 6

This could include tarnishment, because that

involves a harm that may not always fall within the likelihood of
confusion standard. 15 7 Moreover, that flexible dilution formula would
encompass any obsolescence that arises following a technological
change on the scale of the Industrial or Internet Revolutions.
Outside of these limited contexts, however, a trademark use that is
not infringement should not be barred by dilution. 5 '

3. Right of Publicity
In contrast to the troubles encountered by misappropriation and

dilution, the right of publicity was showered with glowing reviews.
Legislatures and courts eagerly adopted Nimmer's concept, and today
most states protect the rights of celebrities.'59 These statutes and
Ringling Bros.).
154. The Court did indicate that circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to
establish actual harm when the competing marks are identical. See id. at 433-34. But this
situation will rarely occur. Few defendants are dumb enough to copy a famous mark
exactly, and even if that did happen, infringement would almost certainly be found
without reaching the dilution issue.
155. See Magliocca, supra note 9, at 955.
156. Any kind of evidence could establish a dilution violation under this formulation,
which would have the advantage of pulling judges out of the morass of figuring out what
proof can be offered in different contexts.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 139-41.
158. Indeed, this was the conclusion of Moseley, which rejected a dilution claim in a
garden-variety case where a likelihood of confusion did not exist. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at
434. Moreover, the test articulated above is consistent with the text of the FTDA, see 15
U.S.C. § 1125 (2000), and with the history of dilution doctrine, see supra notes 131-48 and
accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scipps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-76 (1977)
("The protection of petitioner's right of publicity provides an economic incentive for him
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cases sweep broadly and give famous people control over virtually
any commercial image that evokes their identity.16 ° In many
jurisdictions, this right continues beyond the celebrity's death.' Like
dilution, therefore, the right of publicity shed its radical skin and

became a mainstream legal doctrine.
The right of publicity's march towards legitimacy swept ahead in
spite of numerous criticisms lodged against the idea. Some wonder
whether celebrities really need another entitlement given that they
are already well compensated for their work. 162 Thus, publicity rights
may not provide any meaningful incentives for creativity, and they
can be attacked as an unfair redistribution of wealth from consumers
to famous people. 63 Furthermore, establishing property rights in
celebrity images restricts free speech even though courts try to
6
balance the right of publicity against First Amendment values. 1
Indeed, Michael Madow points out that those most hurt by publicity
rights are marginalized groups that want to express themselves
through cultural icons but can be barred from doing so by their
owners. 65 Lastly, Nimmer's premise that fame is a result of individual
to make the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public.");
RESTATEMENT, supra note 130, § 46 ("One who appropriates the commercial value of a
person's identity by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of
identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability."); Madow, supra note 14, at 131-33
("[T]here is a solid, indeed an overwhelming, consensus within the American legal
community that the right of publicity is a good thing.").
160. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that Vanna White stated a valid claim when she filed suit over an ad containing a
robot in front of a letter board); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d
831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that Johnny Carson's "identity may be exploited even if
his name, John W. Carson, or his picture is not used"). Strictly speaking, the right of
publicity applies to everyone. As a practical matter, however, only celebrities get to take
advantage of this doctrine.
161. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Social Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage
Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 706 (Ga. 1982) (holding that the right of publicity is
descendible).
162. See Madow, supra note 14, at 208-15; see also Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 974 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he additional inducement
for achievement produced by publicity rights are often inconsequential because most
celebrities with valuable commercial identities are already handsomely compensated.").
163. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973; RESTATEMENT, supra note 130, § 46 cmt. c.;
Madow, supra note 14, at 208-15.
164. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1519-21 (9th Cir. 1993);
Carson, 698 F.2d at 840-42 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1078 (2002).
165. See Madow, supra note 14, at 139-41, 144-45 (explaining how the heirs of John
Wayne object to gay and lesbian depictions of him); see also Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at
803 ("[B]ecause celebrities take on personal meanings to many individuals in the society,
the creative appropriation of celebrity images can be an important avenue of individual
expression.").
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skill and effort does not withstand scrutiny.1 66 In a world where the

media has lowered the standard for fame, many people become
167
known through random chance rather than through diligence.

Even entertainers whose fame is a deliberate choice cannot claim
success as theirs alone. Actors rely on writers and directors, singers
need a band, and supermodels use fashion designers. 161 Yet the right
of publicity gives only one person from this collaborative effort

control over all advertising and merchandising revenue that comes
from the use of his or her persona.169

Nevertheless, the right of publicity prospers because it taps into
deep feelings about the nature of freedom. There is something
appealing about the idea that unauthorized commercial uses of a
celebrity's likeness are wrong because they violate his or her sense of
self. 170 As one commentator explained, "From the principle of
personal autonomy it follows that every human being should have the
right to develop his own identity and to decide how and what aspects
of this personal identity will be shown to the rest of the world."17' 1
Using someone's image in an unauthorized commercial context can
be viewed as a kind of assault, as harmful to that person's dignity as
an unwanted sexual advance or the publication of their private diaries
by a tabloid. Indeed, the need for this protection is greater now that
more unwilling people are being shoved into the public spotlight by
166. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
167. For example, it is hard to say that Monica Lewinsky became a celebrity and got to
host a television show because of her talent and hard work. The same is true for the
Hilton sisters or many other celebrities featured on the E! Network.
168. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 975
(10th Cir. 1996) ("[I]n the entertainment industry, a celebrity's fame may largely be the
creation of the media or the audience."). A cultural deconstructionist would say that
everyone who buys a ticket is responsible for an actor's success because fame cannot
happen without an audience. See id. (" 'Stars would all be Louis B. Mayer's cousins if you
could make 'em up'" (quoting Jack Nicholson's comment in JIB FOWLES, STARSTRUCK:
CELEBRITY PERFORMERS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 84 (1992)). One need not go so
far, however, to see that celebrities are not the Horatio Alger figures that Nimmer
described.
169. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 844 (6th Cir.
1983) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (wondering why Johnny Carson was entitled to publicity
rights in the phrase "Here's Johnny" when the phrase was actually invented and spoken by
Ed McMahon).
170. See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra note 99, at 385-86 (arguing for an expansive right of
publicity); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (discussing a
plaintiff's "right to be left alone").
171. JULIUS C.S. PINCKAERS, FROM PRIVACY TOWARD A NEW INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHT IN PERSONA 242 (1996); see Haemmerli, supra note 99, at 413 ("A
labor-based approach is too limited to explain why publicity rights are possible and
normatively desirable.").
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the media. While some reject the notion that celebrities who
deliberately commodify their persona can suffer any dignity harm
from unwanted commercial uses, there should be more sympathy for
those who did not seek fame and may be horrified to find their face
172
on mugs or T-shirts.
The autonomy aspect of the right of publicity also draws support
from broader legal developments since Nimmer's article was
published. For example, the Supreme Court handed down a series of
constitutional cases in recent decades that turned personal autonomy
into a pillar of American law.173 Likewise, the development of sexual
harassment doctrine in the last few decades just reinforces the
heightened protection that dignitary interests now receive. The
growth of these analogous doctrines that emphasize the need to
safeguard fundamental aspects of personhood from intrusion gave the
right of publicity considerable, though unexpected, support that
probably helped to push it from a fringe idea into a powerful force.
4. Some Concluding Thoughts
Before leaving the world of unfair competition, let us pause and
reflect on what the history of trademark law reveals about satellite
doctrines. Specifically, why do some of these concepts thrive while
others fade? There are at least three factors that influenced the
different outcomes that the prior section surveyed.
The first one is the breadth of the response to outdated law. Put
simply, there are radical proposals and then there are really radical
proposals. Misappropriation, dilution, and the right of publicity range
across the spectrum from relatively broad to narrow, and their level
of success after the stabilization of infringement doctrine moves
inversely from not much (misappropriation), to some (dilution), to a
lot (publicity). Thus, a logical conclusion is that the more sweeping a
satellite doctrine is, the less likely it is to survive. This is not a
startling result. After all, lawyers are trained to greet broad and
abstract assertions with skepticism when they are confronted with
172. See Haemmerli, supra note 99, at 404-05. Of course, people who are drafted into
celebrity still have to suffer the indignity of press scrutiny that is protected by the First
Amendment.
173. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2475 (2003) ("Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct."); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869-70 (1992)
(recognizing a woman's right to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain
it without undue interference from the state); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 48586 (1965) (declaring that a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives violates a married
couple's right to privacy).
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concrete problems.174
A second consideration is the degree to which a satellite concept
rests on a deep theoretical justification. One major problem with
misappropriation is that International News did not launch the
doctrine with a compelling explanation. By contrast, dilution and the
right of publicity did develop elaborate rationales, and this made
them more persuasive both in genuine terms and as a handy
smokescreen for private interests.175 The idea that reasons matter
also should not be shocking, because courts and legislatures are
generally unwilling to support a sharp change in the law without
them.
Lastly, the success of a satellite doctrine depends on its proximity
to analogous legal concepts. In other words, the more an idea fits
within an existing framework, the more likely it is to be embraced.
This observation resonates with legal process methods and is
demonstrated most clearly by the relationship between publicity
rights and broader constitutional and statutory developments. To
find a contrary example, just look at dilution. One reason the idea
remains so controversial is that Schechter's innovative redefinition of
the harm inflicted on trademarks does not resemble any other legal
doctrine. As a result, policymakers have resisted applying something
so radical when they can find no guideposts to inspire confidence in
its integrity.
The turbulence in unfair competition law left behind a rich
legacy. There is nothing about its transformative process, however,
that is unique to trademarks. Any body of law can go through a
serious bout of obsolescence, and when that occurs, a similar pattern
of radicalism and retrenchment may appear.

II.

THE LOOMING FRACTURE IN COPYRIGHT

This Part explores the parallels between the evolution of unfair
competition and the direction of contemporary copyright. 7 6 These
two bodies of law are mirror opposites. While the common law was
174. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("General propositions do not decide concrete cases.").
175. Admittedly, the Haelan opinion that introduced the right of publicity was as
cryptic as InternationalNews, but Nimmer quickly rectified that problem with a powerful
and detailed theory. See Nimmer, supra note 13, at 221-22 (discussing Haelan); see also
supra notes 98-121 and accompanying text (summarizing Nimmer's theory).
176. Though this Part stresses the similarity between these heads of areas of
intellectual property law, I must caution that this pattern, as with any other legal
comparison, is by no means perfect. What we are seeking here are analogies that can
provide guidance for copyright going forward.
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too narrow to protect trademarks after the enormous changes
wrought by the Industrial Revolution, copyright law is too broad
following the Internet Revolution. Likewise, the radical responses to
trademark obsolescence proposed broad property rights, while many
of the new ideas in copyright are developing sharp limitations on
entitlements.177 Recognizing this inverse relationship between past
marks and present copyrights can be helpful for a legal community
grappling with the tough issues facing copyright today.'
A.

Too Much of a Good Thing

The idea that copyright protection is now too generous cannot be
evaluated without first explaining a few basic principles.
The
Constitution authorizes Congress to give creators of artistic and
literary material an entitlement in their work for a limited time.7 9
The privileges granted by copyrights are broader than those that a
trademark provides, in the sense that they bar both commercial and
many non-commercial uses of protected expression. 8 ° Congress
recognizes, however, that the public has valid claims on information
and has therefore codified a "fair use" exception that allows
unauthorized
uses
of copyrighted
works
under
certain
circumstances. 8'
Copyrights are necessary because they provide incentives to the
two integral players in the creative process-innovators and
distributors. Although these groups have many interests in common,
they must be distinguished for purposes of analyzing copyright
protection. 8 2 Innovators like authors and artists need incentives
177. One significant difference is that the satellite doctrines in trademark are fully
developed while their copyright equivalents are only beginning to emerge. Accordingly,
some of the discussion in this Part will be speculative. Moreover, the ideas discussed here
do not encompass all of the radical copyright reforms that may be proposed.
178. Bear in mind that this Article focuses on the satellite doctrines that develop from
mainstream reform. Thus, there will be no significant discussion of how orthodox
copyright law should deal with the rise of digital technology.

179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
180. See 17 U.S.C § 501 (2000); see also LESSIG, supra note 17, at 258 (discussing
whether copyright law should exclude noncommercial exploitation).
181. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (defining fair use). The parameters of fair use are explored
infra, notes 253-60 and accompanying text. Granted, fair use is not the only limit on
copyright protection, but it will be the focus in this analysis.
182. See Ku, supra note 10, at 266-67. The credit for this observation goes to Lyman
Ray Patterson, who described how book publishers in eighteenth-century England
attempted to blur the distinction and maintain their royal monopoly by arguing that
authors had natural law property rights in their work. See generally LYMAN RAY
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968) (exploring the origins of
copyright and the battle of the booksellers).
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because the cost of creating is greater than the cost of copying. 183 By
the same token, distributors such as publishing companies or movie
studios need security because the costs of bringing those creations to
market are even more substantial.
As with trademark protection, however, more copyright
protection is not always better. Judge Alex Kozinski eloquently
explained that "[c]reativity is impossible without a rich public
domain .... Culture, like science and technology, grows by accretion,
each new creator building on the works of those who came before.
Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it's supposed to
nurture."' 18
Undue protection of expression raises costs for
subsequent creators in a way that is not true with real property
because intellectual innovators rely so heavily on prior work.
Furthermore, as with the right of publicity, an overly broad scheme
may inhibit new creations by permitting copyright owners to bar
expression that they do not like. 85 This goes to show that copyrights,
like trademarks, are neither monopolies nor property. 186 Legislatures
and courts must again resist these labels and focus on finding the best
balance of incentives to further creativity.
1. The Internet Effect
With this introduction, let us examine how developments in
digital technology are challenging creators and distributors of
copyrighted material. My starting premise is that copyright incentives
were appropriate before the Information Revolution got underway
(i.e., the protection of the 1976 Copyright Act was a sound
baseline). 87 From there, this Section argues that the Internet has

183. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
184. White v. Samsung Elecs. America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); see LESSIG, supra note 17,
at 108-09.
185. See LESSIG, supra note 17, at 4 (describing instances when movie releases were
halted by copyright holders who were upset at the unauthorized depiction of their work in
the films); id. at 198-99 (chronicling the attempt by Margaret Mitchell's estate to bar
publication of the novel The Wind Done Gone).
186. For a thoughtful discussion of this issue, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Can Copyright
Become User-Friendly?, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 71, 73-78 (2001) (reviewing LITMAN,
supra note 2).
187. This assumption can be challenged from both ends. Even in the early 1970s, some
commentators were arguing that copyright law was too expansive. See Stephen Breyer,
The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and
Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 350 (1970). Others undoubtedly took the
opposite view, but there was certainly no clamor on either side to challenge the consensus
following the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act.
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sharply reduced the cost of distributing content and left copyright law
88
in the position of providing excessive protection.
On the creative side, the digital transformation probably has not
had a significant impact on the appropriate level of copyright
incentives. Advances in technology have certainly lowered the cost of
creating intellectual works. Word processing makes it easier to write;
software lets film directors produce once unthinkable special effects
at a reasonable price; and other devices enable musicians to mix
sound at home as if they were in a professional studio. Other
technologies, however, make it easier to copy these same works.
Indeed, many would argue that at this point the reduction in copying
costs caused by CD burners, MP3 files, or scanners outweighs the
creative benefits of digital technology. This contention, which I will
accept for purposes of this discussion, suggests that more copyright
incentives, not less, are required.18 9
The problem with concluding that more incentives are required
is that it conflates the interests of distributors and creators.
Distributors, as the term suggests, earn much of their revenue from
their exclusive right to reproduce and disseminate copyrighted
works. 19° Most creators, on the other hand, do not benefit from this
feature of copyright protection which is, after all, the one most
affected by the new technology. 191 To take just one example, "the
vast majority of musical artists do not earn any income in the form of
royalties from the sale of music."1' 92 Instead, their creative incentives
come from other copyright privileges that are largely unaffected by
the digital revolution, such as the right to perform live or the right to
create derivative works. 193 A similar analysis could be applied to
188. The discussion in this part of the text draws heavily from a recent analysis by
Raymond Shih Ray Ku on the distribution of music. See Ku, supra note 10, at 305-11.
189. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 344 (1989).
190. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (enunciating the exclusive reproduction and
distribution rights).
191. Some types of innovators, notably book authors, do earn substantial income
through royalties that depend on the exclusive reproduction right. As the subsequent text
indicates, however, this is the exception rather than the rule. See infra text accompanying
notes 192-94.
192. Ku, supra note 10, at 306-07.
193. See id. at 308-09; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (providing for exclusive performance
and derivative work rights). This raises a point that deserves some emphasis. This
Article's contention that copyright should contract in response to the Internet Revolution,
is limited to reproduction and distribution rights. The other rights granted by copyright do
not need a similar modification. Moreover, the argument that reproduction and
distribution privileges must be scaled back is not a call for their abolition and should not
be construed as blanket approval for file sharing.
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many actors, artists, comedians, architects, and other creators. Thus,
the overall impact of the Information Revolution on their incentives
is probably quite limited. 194
By contrast, on the distributive end these same technologies
radically reduce costs and substantially diminish the need for
copyright. 195 In brick-and-mortar space, private firms bear the burden
of building massive distribution networks that involve copying,
In
packaging, marketing, and shipping intellectual works. 9 6
cyberspace, however, consumers pay for the construction of these
distribution channels through their computers, subscriptions to
Internet service providers, and applications that upload and
download content. 19 The best known examples involve the sharing of
music, first through Napster and then through peer-to-peer networks
such as Kazaa.' 98 Users of these networks do not pay for all of the
supporting costs, since some entity must write the software and
establish the platform to get things started. Once that project is
launched, however, consumers largely take over by supplying the
content and expanding the network's resources through their
collective investment in computers, burners, scanners, and modems. 99
Thus, it may be somewhat misleading to say that the
downloading of music or other digital content is theft. Those who
engage in this activity could instead be described as investors in a
distribution network that are drawing upon the value they helped to
create. 00 As a leading advocate of this view explains, "The Internet
194. This does not mean that creators are totally unaffected by what happens to
distributive incentives. Obviously, artists and musicians need their work distributed by
somebody. As the text will explain, however, the digital revolution has sharply reduced
the costs of distribution. Accordingly, a reduction in the scope of the copyright monopoly
for distributors is appropriate and would not harm creative activity, though certainly

"superstar" creators who do earn revenues from their exclusive reproduction rights will be

adversely affected. Yet even these celebrities will not suffer much because they can fall
back on the right of publicity. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
195. Professor Ku's analysis draws this conclusion only with respect to the distribution

of music. See Ku, supra note 10, at 264-65. In my view, however, the same analysis
applies to other, though not all, types of copyrighted content.

196. See Ku, supra note 10, at 295-96 (estimating that it costs over $100 million to
maintain a music distribution network in real space).
197. See LESSIG, supra note 17, at 126-32; Ku, supra note 10, at 268.
198. See LESSIG, supra note 17, at 130-32, 134-38; Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89
VA. L. REV. 679, 726-50 (2003); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 64548 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (providing a comprehensive analysis of recent developments

in the file-sharing area).
199. It is worth noting that the entertainment and media conglomerates who complain
about downloading are often the same ones who manufacture and sell the technologies
that allow people to engage in that behavior.
200. In response to this claim, which is a restatement of Professor Ku's core thesis, it
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eliminates the need to create financial incentives because it eliminates
the free rider problem of information distribution. When content is
distributed through the Internet, the public internalizes the costs of
distribution. ' ' 20 1 In other words, on-line technology creates a new
business structure that can be sustained by consumers without robust
copyright incentives for distribution. °2
If one accepts this characterization of file sharing, then the
conclusion that follows is that copyright law is obsolete because it
provides the old level of pre-Internet incentives for distribution, even
20 3
though the need for those incentives is now dramatically lower.
This would not be a problem if existing copyright rules were simply
not enforced against the distribution of digital content on the
Internet. Anyone paying attention to these issues, however, knows
that the brick-and-mortar distributors are doing everything they can
to stop this on-line activity because they do consider it theft.2' They
are probably entitled to do so under current doctrine, 20 5 but this may
could be argued that it applies to any burglar who invests in "redistribution" tools like
guns, crowbars, and a getaway car. The difference between a thief and an investor turns
on whether the resource at issue is owned by someone else and on the social utility of
allowing the alternative mode of distribution. And that is precisely what the Internet
Revolution is forcing the legal community to consider-who should own the right to
reproduce and distribute content online.
201. See Ku, supra note 10, at 301; see also Wu, supra note 198, at 685 (agreeing that
peer-to-peer networks create "a distribution network that eliminates intermediaries," but
arguing that their goal is to facilitate copyright infringement by "remov[ing] the
enforcement efficiency of a gatekeeper system, leaving primary enforcement against endusers as the only option").
202. Ku, supra note 10, at 301; see also Wu, supra note 198, at 716 (explaining the
magnitude of the digital revolution with the comment that "[f]or the 270 years following
copyright's 1710 debut.., copies could not be produced by just anyone").
203. This does not mean that the grant of some exclusive rights to distribute or
reproduce should be abolished. After all, many consumers are neither willing nor able to
download content and need the traditional distribution channels. But copyright interests
require less protection than they did before.
204. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031-32 (C.D. Cal. 2003). There are
ongoing attempts, mainly via iTunes and BuyMusic.com, to set up an on-line distribution
system on a fee basis with the approval of the record studios. While this music is less
expensive than the CDs in a store, that discount is probably driven by the competition
coming from the peer-to-peer networks. If copyright protection allows the brick-andmortar distributors to shut down these "free" networks before the fee-based networks
become firmly established, then the music offered on the authorized on-line services are
likely to escalate in price as the traditional distributors reassert their monopoly power.
205. Almost every court that has reviewed the issue so far has ruled against the legality
of file-sharing. See, e.g., Aimster, 334 F.3d at 655-56 (affirming a preliminary injunction
against a file-sharing software service); A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1039 (affirming a
modified preliminary injunction to shut down Napster, Inc., a peer-to-peer file sharing
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just reinforce the view that the law in this area is outdated.
Of course, many reject this sanguine view of file sharing and
argue that the growth of the Internet requires more property
protection to give traditional firms an incentive to build superior
distribution systems.20 6 One problem with peer-to-peer networks is

that their architecture must be highly decentralized to avoid copyright
infringement liability. Building a network on this decentralized
premise, however, does not optimize performance, and the result is

that the "free" systems are not as fast, stable, or user-friendly as they
could be.2" 7 Moreover, one reason copyright holders are vested with

broad rights over distribution and the creation of derivative works is
that there is an expectation that they will do a better job, in the long

run, at providing quality services.20 That kind of innovation can only
happen, however, if the copyright owner believes that its investment

in an on-line network will be protected and can earn a decent
return.2 09
In spite of these powerful points, I think the proponents of
reducing copyright protection in light of the Digital Age have the
better of the argument. The metaphor that captures the relationship
between the new technology and copyright is Schumpeter's
description of markets as an engine of "creative destruction."'21 0

service). But see MGM Studios, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1049 (refusing to sanction distributors
of software that enabled peer-to-peer file sharing on the grounds that the distributors were
not responsible for their customers' illegal conduct).
206. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of
Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1618 (2001) ("[Copyright owners'] concern
persuaded Congress that it could foster participation in digital communication only be
reinforcing copyright owners' control over the distribution of their works.").
207. Wu, supra note 198, at 717; see id. at 722 ("The point is that P2P design represents
a serious challenge for designers because it requires compromise. Fewer intermediaries
means fewer targets for an infringement lawsuit. The existence of fewer intermediaries,
however, makes it harder for users to use the system, creates a greater risk of system
crashes, and increases the risk of anonymous attacks."); id. at 731-33 (describing the
problems of Gnutella, a successor of Napster that attempted to avoid copyright
infringement liability by extreme decentralization).
208. See Ginsburg, supra note 206, at 1631 (explaining that Congress passed the Digital
Millenium Copyright Act, not to help copyright owners "turn back the clock; rather, given
adequate assurance of its amenability to copyright enforcement, copyright owners were
expected to exploit the new market").
209. Indeed, Professor Ginsburg offers a number of historical examples where this
scenario played out in the context of new copying devices. See id. at 1620-30. She
concedes, however, that these examples can be distinguished from the digital revolution
because the former "involved discrete innovations, while the Internet is a whole system of
communication, rather than a specific device." Id. at 1631.
210. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-86
(1976); see Ku, supra note 10, at 268-69 (developing this insightful formulation).
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Innovation often eliminates entire industries or business methods by
giving competitors an overwhelming advantage. These developments
are embraced by everyone outside the Luddite fringe because people
recognize that the economic dislocations that result pale in
comparison to the benefits that these new technologies will bring.
Today it is the traditional distribution model of the recording industry
(and maybe other copyright distributors) that is being creatively
destroyed.
Naturally, this is painful to these once-profitable
distribution businesses and to their employees, but the same was true
for the horse-and-buggy industry following the invention of the car.
The law should embrace and try to harness innovation, not fight a
rearguard action against it.
In sum, the Internet leaves chunks of the current copyright
system looking like boats stuck on the beach after the tide rolls out.
Just as the trademark doctrine was unable to meet the demands of the
Industrial Revolution, copyright law has not adequately responded to
the Internet's impact on distribution costs.
2. The Revenge of the Right of Publicity
While technology is exerting strong pressure on copyright's
distributive incentives, a separate development is undercutting the
need for copyright on the creative side. The right of publicity, which
was a product of trademark obsolescence, is now exacerbating
copyright's crisis. And, in an ironic way, this may turn out to be
another good reason for supporting the right of publicity.
Simply put, publicity rights reduce the need for copyright
protection because they allow famous creators to capture advertising
and merchandising revenue that they could not get before. For most
of our history, celebrities were not entitled to these proceeds.21 1
Traditional copyright incentives were therefore built around the
premise that there was no such right to profit from fame. Since
copyright law never reacted to the subsequent development of
publicity rights, it follows that the current scheme of protection is too
broad, assuming, as this analysis does, that copyright incentives were
appropriate before the right of publicity gained significant support.2 12
211. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. Admittedly, this assumption is not as
robust as the one noted earlier concerning the Information Revolution. This is because
some states did recognize publicity rights at the time that the 1976 Copyright Act-the
baseline for traditional copyright incentives-was enacted. Nonetheless, the premise is
still valid. There is no indication that Congress seriously considered the impact of the
right of publicity when it established the new level of copyright protection.
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The impact of the right of publicity on creators is certainly much
smaller than the distributive cost revolution wrought by the Internet.
After all, only a small number of artists or performers are famous
enough to benefit financially from publicity rights.213 Yet the growth
of Nimmer's idea from a satellite doctrine into a mainstream concept
weighs in favor of less copyright protection.
This observation offers a unique perspective on publicity rights
that harkens back to the pragmatic arguments originally made on its
behalf. When Nimmer defended his proposal as a way of updating
trademark law, one of his points was that the right of publicity was a
better option for dealing with the problem than was
misappropriation.2 14 In essence, he argued that the right was useful
because the alternatives were far worse. An analogous contention
can be made about the link between the right of publicity and
copyright. Perhaps the value of publicity rights lies not in their effect
on creative incentives, but in their utility as a tool for alleviating
copyright obsolescence. In other words, the right of publicity helps
expose the breadth in modern copyright law. Thus, people concerned
about creativity may want to embrace publicity rights, even if they are
skeptical about their intrinsic value, and use their growth as a
rhetorical weapon to persuade Congress that copyright protection
needs to be scaled back.
3. Going Down the Wrong Track
Confronted with these powerful technological and doctrinal
forces, copyright law did not contract. Instead, Congress expanded
copyright protection. That means the present situation is in some
respects worse than the one trademark endured in the early twentieth
century. At that time the authorities merely sat on their hands. Now
they are actually compounding the problem.
In 1998, Congress fueled the fire by passing two major statutes
that broadened copyright privileges. One was the aforementioned
Copyright Term Extension Act ("CTEA"), which was upheld in
Eldred and increased copyright protection by twenty years. 215 The
other was the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), which
213. As was mentioned earlier, these are the same people who probably are hurt by a
reduction in protection for reproduction and distribution. See supra note 194. But since
these creators are reaping a significant windfall from the right of publicity that gives them
incentives over and above the optimal level established by copyright, the overall impact on
their creative activity will probably be negligible.
214. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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established a regulatory framework for the Internet by vesting
copyright holders with broad rights over the dissemination of digital
content. 216 Of particular interest is the anti-circumvention portion of
the DMCA, which bars the development of technology designed to
evade protective measures for copyrighted material.217 Many find this
section troubling because it does not contain exceptions for fair use
and could sweep academic research or other expressive activity under
its prohibitions.2"'
This move towards a more robust copyright regime fits the
pattern set forth by the trademark precedents. Recall that one reason
courts held fast to obsolete unfair competition doctrines for so long
was that they were fixated on the idea that marks were dangerous
monopolies. 219 Today, we face the other side of the coin. There is
now an unsound tendency to see copyrights as property that should
get the same protection as land or chattels.2 In upholding the anticircumvention provision, the Second Circuit made this point clear by
saying that "[o]wners of all property rights are entitled to prohibit
access to their property by unauthorized persons.... In its basic
function, [code] is like a lock on a homeowner's door, a combination
of a safe, or a security device attached to a store's products. ' 221 That
string of metaphors is as misguided as the prior fallacy of calling
marks monopolies. So long as the property label holds sway over
Congress and the courts, however, copyright protection will remain
under strong pressure to expand and provide "real" property rights.
216. See Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 502, 112 Stat. 2860,
2905-16 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000)); Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act, Pub L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (1998) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). See generally David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair
Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (2000) (offering an
overview of the statute).
217. See Digital Millenium Copyright Act § 1201, 112 Stat. at 2863-64 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000)) ("No person shall circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title."); LESSIG,
supra note 17, at 187; LITMAN, supra note 2, at 143.
218. See LESSIG, supra note 17, at 188-90; LITMAN, supra note 2, at 143-44; Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention
Regulations Need To Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 563-64 (1999). The
Copyright Office issued interpretive rules that granted exemptions to two narrow classes
of works but emphasized that its discretion to do more was limited. See LITMAN, supra
note 2, at 149-50 n.30.
219. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
220. See LESSIG, supra note 17, at 81; Patterson, supra note 46, at 53-56. Jack Valenti,
the chief lobbyist of the movie industry, takes this thought to its logical conclusion by
arguing that copyrights should be perpetual just like the fee simple. See Hughes, supra
note 17, at 784-85.
221. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 452-53 (2d Cir. 2001).
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In sum, copyright finds itself in a deepening crisis. The digital
transformation and, to a lesser extent, the right of publicity leave the
law saddled with a host of untenable premises.
Rather than
addressing copyright's excessive breadth, Congress is making the
problem worse. As was the case when trademark suffered through its
bout of obsolescence, impatient voices are starting to propose radical
remedies.
B.

The Emerging Satellite Doctrinesof Copyright

Many scholars have expressed dismay at these recent
developments and suggested a variety of copyright reforms. While
most of the ideas involve gradual change, the academy has again
become a breeding ground for more drastic solutions. This Section
reviews three budding satellite doctrines that propose:
(1)
constitutional limits on copyright, (2) restricting protection to
commercial uses, and (3) using time as an element in assessing the
scope of protection. Consistent with the inverse relationship between
trademarks past and copyrights present, these three responses bear a
resemblance to their respective counterparts in unfair competition
that may reveal something about their future prospects. 222
1. Constitutional Scrutiny
For those who are exasperated at Congress's unwillingness to
reduce copyright protection, the radical solution of first resort is to
claim that the Constitution imposes limits on copyright that courts
must enforce. 23 The most sophisticated of these arguments came
from Lawrence Lessig and formed the backbone of his presentation
in the Eldred case.224 After assessing Lessig's views, this discussion
shows how his unprecedented proposal for addressing copyright
obsolescence is the reverse parallel of misappropriation.
Professor Lessig is one of the leading academics concerned about
copyright's failure to adapt to the digital revolution. Taking a page
222. Again, these similarities should not be overstated. This Article examines the
three reforms in copyright that parallel the satellite doctrines in unfair competition law.
There will undoubtedly be some radical copyright proposals put forward that will not find
partners in trademark precedent.
223. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free As the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 386 (1999)
(invoking the First Amendment as an affirmative limitation on the Copyright Clause);
Julie Cohen, A Right To Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management"
in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 981-83 (1996) (same).
224. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003) (citing Lessig as counsel for
petitioners). See generally Lessig, supra note 11 (sketching his arguments).
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out of the Schechter and Nimmer playbook, he justified his novel
approach by focusing on "how extreme our view of copyright has
become;

how unbalanced, how unmitigated.

' 225

After taking

Congress to task for defining copyrights more and more like property,
Lessig pointed out that this trend is particularly distressing "[a]s we
move into the Internet Age-as ordinary people can become
publishers ... [and] as we use the technology to share content, or
enable others to get access. '226 He concluded that "this black hole of
copyright" demanded an immediate solution.227

After defining the problem in such stark terms, Lessig proposed
slashing copyright protection through aggressive judicial review of the
"Limited Times" provision of the Copyright Clause and of the First
Amendment. 28 He argued that the Limited Times provision "must
mean something when it says [copyright] terms must be limited ...
[and should] be read in light of the command that Congress exercise
this power to 'promote ...

Progress.'

"229

Under this view, the

CTEA's extension of existing copyrights, not just future ones, was
invalid "since such an extension promotes nothing except the bottom
line of (mainly) publishers. "230 Once something is created, the
argument continued, there is no social benefit in giving its developer
additional incentives for that old work. Accordingly, Lessig wanted
judges to help replenish the stock of materials in the public domain by
holding that Congress can never retroactively increase copyright
terms.23 1
While the Copyright Clause discussion applied only to the length
of protection, Lessig's First Amendment analysis was broader.
Drawing on doctrine holding that copyright coheres with the First
Amendment because the former is the "engine of free expression," he
225. Lessig, supra note 11, at 1068.
226. Id. at 1072; see id. at 1069 ("No longer may one suggest that literary property
should be treated differently from other forms of property.").
227. See LESSIG, supra note 17, at 251.
228. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
229. Lessig, supra note 11, at 1066.
230. Id. at 1067. Moreover, opponents of the CTEA argued that the power to extend
copyrights retroactively conflicts with the limited times text because Congress can,
through repeated extensions, make them perpetual. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
209-10 (2003).
231. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193 ("The 'limited Time' in effect when a copyright is
secured, petitioners urge, becomes the constitutional boundary, a clear line beyond the
power of Congress to extend."). Dissenting in Eldred, Justice Breyer argued that the
limited times argument could also invalidate the extension of future copyrights beyond a
certain term of years. See id. at 264-65 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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contended that the obsolete scope of copyright protection now casts
doubt on that conclusion.23 2 Extending creative and distributive
incentives beyond a certain point, he said, only restricts expression
and cannot survive the heightened scrutiny that courts normally give
to content-neutral regulations of speech. 233
Thus, unlike the
Copyright Clause argument, which only inquired into whether
Congress had a rational basis for its retroactive copyright decisions,
the First Amendment theory subjected both retroactive and
prospective expansion to a searching judicial inquiry. 3 4
Either of these interpretations, if accepted, would have
dramatically changed copyright law. Never in the history of the
Republic has a court struck down an exercise of Congress's plenary
copyright power. Yet Lessig wanted to give judges the power to
invalidate these statutes based almost entirely on a policy
determination that the decision granting protection was erroneous.2 35
The timing of this assertion was no coincidence. Like his academic
forebears, Lessig responded to a serious case of legal obsolescence by
developing a doomsday weapon that addressed the problem but also
carried enormous collateral costs.
That insight invites the conclusion that the constitutional attacks
on copyright are the functional equivalent of using misappropriation
to solve the problems of trademark obsolescence. Both Lessig's
writings and InternationalNews support doctrines that would transfer
congressional authority over intellectual property to the judiciary.
Both provide little guidance about how judges should ascertain when
to overrule Congress's decisions. 23 6 Finally, each was designed to
remedy legal backwardness by giving judges unfettered discretion to
act on equitable grounds. The only difference between Lessig's
theory and misappropriation is that one reduces protection while the
other expands protection. The concepts are best understood as
mirror opposites that are similarly situated with respect to their
232. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985);
Lessig, supra note 11, at 1067; see also Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the
First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1202

(1970) (concluding that the idea/expression dichotomy in copyright doctrine was sufficient
to meet constitutional concerns).
233. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193; Lessig, supra note 11, at 1067.
234. See Lessig, supra note 11, at 1067.
235. As Eldred explains, the legal support for Lessig's interpretation was weak. See
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 197-98. Policy concerns were really his only ammunition and the only
guidance that courts could use. See infra notes 265-70 and accompanying text.
236. To be fair, Lessig's principle barring retroactive expansions of copyright is
relatively clear. But when it comes to his First Amendment analysis, the clarity of the
proposal disappears.
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particular obsolescence crises.
And, as befits their parallel
relationship, they ultimately received the same negative treatment.237
2. Professor Litman and the Commercial Angle
The most dramatic reform that does not rely on the Constitution
comes from Jessica Litman. In her recent book, Digital Copyright,
Litman provides a fine summary of the obsolescence problem and
argues that the solution lies in recasting the harm of copyright
infringement.238 Specifically, she contends that only uses that harm
"the copyright holder's opportunities for commercial exploitation"
should be prohibited. 239 This idea, which Litman herself describes as
"radical," would strip significant protection from copyright owners
who can currently bar many non-commercial uses of their work.2 4
Litman lays the predicate for her formula by emphasizing the
conflict between the digital revolution and established copyright law.
The core of her analysis is set forth in the following crisp passage:
Digital technology changed the marketplace. It's a clich6 that
digital technology permits everyone to become a publisher. If
you're a conventional publisher, though, that clich6 doesn't
sound so attractive. If you're a record company, the last thing
you want is a world in which musicians and listeners can
eliminate the middleman. But can you stop it, or at least delay
it? Is the copyright law one tool that might help you do so?241
Litman goes on to explain that copyright law is, in fact, being used as
a tool against digital distribution and is imposing significant costs on
society. 242 The root cause of this trend is that "[c]opyright laws
become obsolete when technology renders the assumptions on which
they were based outmoded. '243 Writing with palpable alarm, Litman
contends that we are "in very real danger of adopting a set of rules for
2
our information society that few of us can live with." "
Prompted by this danger, Litman proposes overturning a century
of precedent by eliminating the exclusive right to reproduce a
copyrighted work and replacing it with a more limited commercial
237.
238.
239.
240.

See infra notes 271-77 and accompanying text.
See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 22-34, 77-88, 151-65.
Id. at 180.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

241. LITMAN, supra note 2, at 19.

242. See id. at 25-33.
243. Id. at 22. Litman, like Lessig, is also critical of the drift towards viewing
copyrights as property. See id. at 81.
244. Id. at 32.
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exploitation right. 45 She notes that "[t]he public appears to believe

that the copyright law incorporates a distinction between commercial
and noncommercial behavior. ' 24 6 Building on this observation, she
proposes that only "[m]aking money (or trying to) from someone
else's work without permission would be infringement, as would
large-scale interference with the copyright holders' opportunities to
do so. ' ' 247 Through this commercial exploitation test, Litman exempts

most people who download content from copyright infringement
because they are not trying to make money and are not engaged in
248
large-scale activity.

From the perspective gained by comparing trademark with
copyright, Litman's theory is best understood as the modern parallel
of dilution. In each instance, the response to legal obsolescence

drastically redefined the pertinent harm in order to transform the
level of protection.249

Schechter lowered the bar for trademark

plaintiffs by asserting that a harm to the mark's uniqueness was
sufficient to justify relief. 25° Litman, by contrast, wants to raise the
bar for copyright plaintiffs by requiring them to prove a commercial
harm that they do not have to prove now. Furthermore, both reforms
were
narrower
than
the
ones
represented
in
the
misappropriation/Lessig pair because they applied only to a specific
type of intellectual property rather than to all such property.251 Yet
the dilution/Litman coupling also has a similar drawback-they are
hard to apply in a coherent fashion because they replace a concrete
245. See id. at 177-78, 180; see also LESSIG, supra note 17, at 258 (explaining that the
current system regulating non-commercial activity dates back at least to the 1909
Copyright Act). Litman tries to take some of the sting out of her remedy by saying that
"[tihe right to make copies... is not fundamental to copyright in any sense other than the
historical one." LITMAN, supra note 2, at 177. That is a bit like saying that the sky is not
blue in any sense other than the visual one.
246. LITMAN, supra note 2, at 180.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 180-81, 183.
249. The presence of this connection, along with the others identified in this section, is
not really that remarkable. After all, there are only so many ways to transform the scope
of an entitlement. One creates a new equitable doctrine that allows courts to adjust
protection (Lessig's theory of misappropriation). Another redefines the actionable harm
to the interest at stake (Litman's theory of dilution). A third involves hiving off a specific
part of the interest at stake and giving it special treatment (right of publicity/timeabandonment).
250. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
251. Learned Hand made this point about misappropriation, see supra text
accompanying notes 75-78, and there was nothing about Lessig's constitutional approach
that was limited to copyright. For example, the "Limited Times" provision of the
Constitution, which Lessig sought to recast, applies to both patents and copyrights. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 8.
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harm with a more amorphous one. Indeed, Litman concedes that her
test would replace a clear infringement rule with an uncertain
standard because the analysis of whether a use is commercial or
whether a non-commercial use is large enough to interfere with a
copyright owner's commercial rights is highly contextual.252 And, as
was the case with misappropriation and Lessig's theory, the
similarities between Litman's proposal and Schechter's article are
matched by the distinction that the former diminishes protection
while the latter enlarges it. This parallel with dilution suggests that
Litman's views have a viable, though not uncomplicated, future.
3. The Flow of Time
A third potential satellite doctrine comes from two scholars,
writing independently, who contend that copyright should be limited
by making the age of a work an element in fair use analysis.25 3 This
idea is different from those discussed earlier because it actually fits
within mainstream copyright law. Nevertheless, including this reform
in the present analysis is appropriate because its implications are far
reaching and may deepen if the pressures of copyright obsolescence
are not relieved.
The fair use exception is an obvious resource for lawyers who
want to curtail copyright protection. From its origin as a gloss on
congressional statutes, fair use is now codified in a set of nonexclusive factors that permit unauthorized copyright uses when they
serve the public interest.25 4 In this sense, copyright contains an escape
valve, absent from common-law trademark, that allows courts to
adjust protection in light of new realities. So far, however, judges
have not used this authority to address the difficulties of modern
copyright law. This should not be surprising given the new orthodoxy
that copyrights are property, which makes fair use look more like an
annoying impediment to exclusive control than an integral part of a
balanced system of incentives.
Responding to the threat posed by the breadth in copyright
protection, at least two scholars suggest that judges use the age of a
252. See LITMAN, supra note 2, at 180-81.
253. See Hughes, supra note 17, at 778; Liu, supra note 13, at 409-10.
254. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (listing four major fair use factors as: (1) "the purpose
and character of the use;" (2) "the nature of the copyrighted work;" (3) "the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;" and (4)
"the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work");
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (Story, J.)
(inventing the fair use doctrine).
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work to enlarge fair use.2 5' They argue that the older something is the
more people ought to able to use it without restriction. 6 Justin
Hughes reaches this conclusion through a law and economics analysis
emphasizing that old works have less commercial value than new

creations.

7

Joseph P. Liu concurs with a holistic approach explaining

that "copyright seeks a diversity of expression" and that "society's
interest in seeing different perspectives and re-interpretations of the
'
original work increases over time."258
To continue with the comparative approach that underlies this
Article, using time as a limit on copyright protection as Hughes and

Liu suggest mirrors the right of publicity's relationship with
trademark. In both instances, the obsolescence response was focused

on a concrete facet of the problem-time in copyright and fame in
trademark-and argued that this facet should be addressed separately
with a special set of principles. That narrower focus makes it much

easier for these reforms to garner support while avoiding the pitfalls
inherent in developing a comprehensive solution. 259 As with the other

two satellite doctrine pairs, the critical difference between the use of
time analysis and the right of publicity rests with their opposing
orientations-one contracting entitlements and the other expanding

them.
This time, however, the analogy with the other satellite pairs is
incomplete. After all, Hughes and Liu are proposing an evolutionary

reform, while Nimmer was putting forward something more
sweeping. The time element they embrace, however, could become
255. Having recounted the obsolescence problem and how it has motivated the radical
proposals reviewed in Part I.B, there is no need to raise the point again. Suffice it to say,
the proponents of using time in fair use analysis are as worried about the expansion of
copyright as everybody else. See Hughes, supra note 17, at 785-86 (complaining that
"every ten or twenty years, Congress can pass a law extending copyrights another ten or
twenty years"); Liu, supra note 13, at 427 ("Like many other commentators, I am troubled
by the continuing expansion of copyright protection on a number of different fronts.
Specifically, I believe that many of these expansions find little or no support under any of
the policy justifications underlying copyright law.").
256. See Hughes, supra note 17, at 778; Liu, supra note 13, at 412. This principle fits
within the established framework because the factors listed in the fair use section of the
copyright statute are non-exhaustive. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. Moreover, the advocates of
this approach contend that the age of a work is also relevant to the enumerated fair use
factors. See Hughes, supra note 17, at 776-78; Liu, supra note 13, at 454-57.
257. See Hughes, supra note 17, at 781-84; id. at 781 ("Tolerating a small unauthorized
use in 2002 of a 1962 film cannot have any widespread impact on the market that the film
enjoyed for the first forty years of the ninety-five-year copyright. Tolerating the same
infringement of the film in 2022 has even less possible impact ....
258. Liu, supra note 13, at 437-38.
259. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
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much more aggressive if the need for a copyright correction is not
met.

What if courts started declaring that the failure to use a

copyright for a short period of time caused an irrevocable forfeiture
of the owner's rights? The potential for this muscular form of
"copyright abandonment" is addressed in the next section.26 °
Accordingly, the inversely parallel obsolescence crises that
trademark and copyright faced extended through the satellite
doctrines that developed in each era. With that insight in hand, let us
now try to project the future of copyright.
C.

Looking into the Crystal Ball

This Section offers some concluding thoughts on how the
satellite doctrines of copyright may unfold. In one case, the answer is
clear. Lessig's effort to create rigorous constitutional restrictions on
2 61
copyright protection was rejected in Eldred.
As for the other two
reform proposals, no clear trend has emerged. The guidance that
flows from matching past trademark patterns with present copyright
developments, however, suggests that there is some promise in
Litman's proposal and even more in the use of time to rein in
copyright incentives.26 2
1. Eldred
In Eldred, the Court faced a problem similar to the one it
addressed in Moseley, except here the issue was what to do when the
260. See infra notes 283-90 and accompanying text. There is already an abandonment
concept in copyright, but that doctrine is highly circumscribed because it can only be
invoked if an owner of a work takes an overt action to relinquish his or her rights. See
Nat'l Comics Publ'ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ'ns, 191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 1951) (L. Hand,
J.). The potential abandonment doctrine discussed infra, notes 283-90 and accompanying
text, would look more like its strict liability counterpart in trademark.
261. See infra text accompanying notes 265-71.
262. At this point a broad objection can be raised about how strong the connection is
between what happened in trademark and what will happen in copyright. Specifically, one
could say that it is more likely, for public choice reasons, that legislatures will expand
property rights than contract them. According to this view, the response to trademark
obsolescence through such an expansion was not surprising, but we should not expect an
analogous reduction in copyright protection by a Congress that is strongly influenced by
movie studios, the recording industry, and other supporters of the status quo.
This observation has force, but I reject the conclusion that copyright will not
adjust to the Digital Age through a reduction in protection. In fact, the level of copyright
incentives has already dropped dramatically when one considers that the traditional
distributors of music and movies are unable to stop file sharing. Granted, copyright law
has not moved in this direction, but Congress will eventually be compelled to acknowledge
the reality of this Schumpeterian creative destruction. See supra note 210 and
accompanying text.
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obsolescence animating a satellite doctrine is ongoing rather than a
distant memory. 263 The response this time was more emphatic as the
Justices rejected Lessig's argument against the CTEA's retroactive

extension of protection. Given the parallels between his approach
and misappropriation, this outcome was not unexpected.26 Indeed,
once the constitutional jargon is cleared away, it is clear that Lessig's
response to legal obsolescence failed for the same reasons that

undermined misappropriation.
Eldred focused on legal process concerns in concluding, as Hand
did for misappropriation,2 65 that Congress alone should define the
scope of intellectual property protection. 26 6 The Court stated that

"[b]eneath the facade of their inventive constitutional interpretation,
petitioners forcefully urge that Congress pursued very bad policy in

prescribing the CTEA's long terms. The wisdom of Congress's
267
Of
action, however, is not within our province to second guess.
particular interest in assessing the "limited times" argument was the
unbroken congressional practice of extending copyright protection

retroactively each time terms were increased. 268 As for Lessig's First
Amendment theory, the Court was not persuaded. Repeating the
mantra of prior cases, Eldred opined that "[t]he Copyright Clause and
First Amendment were adopted close in time. This proximity
indicates that, in the Framers' view, copyright's limited monopolies
are compatible with free speech principles. '269 In response to Lessig's

view that this insight is now being strained beyond its breaking point,
the Court answered that when "Congress has not altered the
traditional contours of copyright protection, further First
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.""27 This conclusion, along with
the Justices' analysis of the limited times issue, slams the door on any
263. See supra text accompanying notes 149-54.
264. Of course, the Court did embrace misappropriation in InternationalNews, so one
question is why Lessig's proposal could not match this success. The best explanation is
that the never-to-be-repeated embrace of misappropriation by the Court was driven by the
fact that the obsolescence in trademark was a prolonged event by the time the Court
heard the case. By contrast, Eldred came along early in the cycle of copyright
obsolescence and therefore the perceived need for a remedy was not as great. Had the
case been brought five or ten years from now, things might have turned out differently.
265. See supra text accompanying note 78.
266. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 (2003) ("The CTEA reflects
judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, judgments we cannot dismiss as outside the
Legislature's domain.").
267. Eldred,537 U.S. at 222.
268. See id. at 200-01 (citing the Copyright Acts of 1790, 1831, 1909, and 1976); id. at
211-14 (relying on practice).
269. Id. at 219.
270. Id. at 221.
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future constitutional challenge to copyright. 7 1
The demise of Lessig's proposal, like the failure of
misappropriation, can be explained by two of the factors set forth
earlier about the viability of satellite doctrines.272 First, a major
weakness in the constitutional attacks on copyright lies in their sheer
breadth. In essence, the Court was asked to embrace a theory that
would lead to regular judicial review over congressional copyright
decisions without a clear limiting principle.273
Under these
circumstances, one can understand why the Court might decline the
invitation. Second, Lessig's approach is hard to relate to any other
legal concept and hence is more difficult for courts to accept. For
instance, his "limited times" argument is alien to constitutional law
and finds no support in precedent. Furthermore, while his First
Amendment theory can draw upon a rich background, those sources,
as the Court explained, are about the right to speak rather than the
right to use other people's expression.2 74
This weakness was
illustrated by Lessig's heavy reliance on Turner BroadcastingSystem,
Inc. v. FCC, which involved the "must-carry" requirements for cable
television broadcasters that were imposed by Congress and
unsuccessfully challenged as a First Amendment violation of the
cable companies' expressive rights. 275 He argued that Turner's
intermediate scrutiny standard should be applied to the CTEA and,
citing Justice O'Connor's dissent, that the CTEA involved "speech
restrictions for the benefit of some speakers [copyright owners] at the
expense of other speakers and listeners ... [that] are no more
sanctioned by the First Amendment than a tax on CNN to benefit CSPAN. 276 That strained analogy was the best he could do, and the
2 77
Court answered brusquely that Turner "bears little on copyright.
271. See id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Fairly read, the Court has stated that
Congress's actions under the Copyright/Patent Clause are, for all intents and purposes,
judicially unreviewable.").
272. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75. The second of those three factors, the
existence of a deep theoretical account, is not particularly helpful, since the Supreme
Court rejected Lessig's arguments in spite of his efforts to provide such a framework. See
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219; supra note 269 and accompanying text.
273. Admittedly, Lessig's argument before the Court was more concrete in that it
focused only on retroactive extensions of copyright. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 193.
Nevertheless, the broader implications of his approach were clear enough to get the
attention of Justice Breyer. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
274. See Eldred,537 U.S. at 219-20.
275. 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994); see Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220.
276. See Brief for Petitioners at 41, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01618), available at 2002 WL 1041928 (citing Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 676 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)).
277. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220.
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With its scope and its sui generis character, Lessig's solution to
copyright obsolescence mirrored misappropriation in substance and
in fate.
2. The Future of Radical Reform
The proposals to redefine infringement as a commercial
exploitation test or to use time to limit protection have not yet
reached the courts. Upon reviewing the factors that shape the success
of satellite doctrines, however, one can see that these copyright ideas
have a growth potential that matches their unfair competition
counterparts of dilution and the right of publicity. Both Litman's idea
and the time suggestions have a strong theoretical base and have the
advantage of being narrower than a constitutional approach. The
point that this Section dwells on, however, is that these initiatives
have legs largely because they resemble concepts that are already
robust in trademark.
That proximity should give courts and
legislatures the confidence to push these satellite doctrines further.
a.

Commercial Exploitation

The idea that copyright infringement should be restricted to uses
that harm commercial exploitation finds a parallel in the trademark
rule that only unauthorized commercial uses may be enjoined. 8 In
the unfair competition context, the limitation is sound because noncommercial uses simply do not have a significant impact on a mark's
ability to convey information in the marketplace. More broadly, that
rule represents a wise judgment about the balance the law should
strike between protecting mark owners and facilitating expression. 79
When legislators and courts are eventually presented with some
version of Litman's test, they may be more receptive to the idea
because a related doctrine exists elsewhere in intellectual property.
The presence of a developed body of law analyzing the boundary
between commercial and non-commercial trademark uses also
supplies a guidepost that should give policymakers confidence that an
analogous system can be worked out in copyright. 8 °
278. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2000) (limiting infringement relief to a "use in
commerce" by a junior mark); id. § 1125(a)(1) (stating that dilution can only occur
through "uses in commerce").
279. For examples of how trademarks contribute to expression, consider the use of
"Star Wars" to denote the SDI missile defense system, the use of the Wendy's slogan
"Where's the Beef' in the 1984 Democratic presidential primaries, or the phrase "It's a
Dusey" to describe something amazing, which started as the slogan of the Dusenburg auto
company.
280. In this respect, Litman's reform is distinguishable from dilution. Schechter's
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This does not mean, however, that Litman's proposed reform of
the copyright infringement test will sail through without difficulties.
Weighing against the legal proximity factor is the fact that Litman's
redefinition of infringement is a sweeping change that breaks with
decades of copyright precedent. The best way of projecting how this
may play out is by drawing upon the link between her proposal and
trademark dilution. If that comparison holds, then efforts to restrict
copyright infringement to commercial exploitation may have a
relatively easy time getting accepted but a hard time getting applied.
After all, courts still cannot make sense out of dilution and therefore
use it sparingly even though legislatures find it appealing.
The comparison with dilution, however, also suggests a path that
this new copyright concept might take towards mainstream
acceptance. Just as some courts faced with trademark obsolescence
used dilution to extend protection even before it was codified, courts
confronting copyright obsolescence may start declaring more noncommercial acts to be fair use or otherwise exempt from protection in
a manner that will stretch existing doctrine to its limit. This type of
bottom-up activity may, in turn, lead to congressional action, just as
the early embrace of dilution theory by courts laid the foundation for
" ' Such a projection, of course, depends on
legislative action there.28
how long copyright obsolescence persists and on whether other
justifications for Litman's proposal emerge. If history is any guide,
however, those rationales will develop and sustain this satellite
doctrine even after copyright's crisis passes.282
b. Abandonment
Using time as a factor in restricting copyright protection, as
Hughes and Liu suggest, finds a reliable ally in the trademark concept
of abandonment. The Lanham Act states, in relevant part, that a
mark falls into the public domain if its use is "discontinued with intent
not to resume such use. 283 To guide courts in this analysis, the
statute also provides that "[n]onuse for 3 consecutive years shall be
prima facie evidence of abandonment. '2 84 Abandonment doctrine
proposal had no analog elsewhere in the law. Thus, while there are considerable problems
with applying Litman's test, they are not as severe as was the case in the dilution analysis.
281. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
282. At this point, it is difficult to say how Litman's idea might be conceptualized as an
independent doctrine. After all, it took years for Schechter's trademark proposal to
develop the moniker "dilution."
283. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
284. Id.
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recognizes that trademarks are a creature of the marketplace and
cannot exist in the absence of commercial activity.2 85 A mark tells
consumers nothing if it is not being used, and the message of a
defunct brand name, e.g., Pan Am, fades over time. Thus, there is no
reason to keep giving these mark owners protection. Again though, a
temporal limit on trademark rights can be seen as part of a broader
conclusion about the best way to balance private incentives with
public access.8 6
While the calls for introducing time as a factor in fair use are
modest, under the unrelenting pressure of copyright obsolescence
they may well evolve into a rigorous abandonment doctrine. The
modification Hughes and Liu propose is an excellent idea and
probably will be adopted eventually, but tinkering with the fair use
exception will not do much because that concept cannot reach the
bulk of copyrighted material, which is, of course, not old at all. On
the other hand, using time as the determinative factor, rather than
just one of many, in whether a copyright is valid could affect almost
all protected material. A rule may well evolve that copyright owners
forfeit all rights if they fail to use a work for a defined period of
time.2 8 Unless a copyright is particularly valuable, many owners will
probably allow their work to pass into the public domain under this
system and concentrate on new products rather than on spending
money to keep their old material secure. 88 Incorporating a more
robust abandonment idea into copyright could significantly reduce
the duration of copyright protection and alleviate its obsolescence.
Thus, abandonment is another satellite doctrine that may spring
forth from the crisis in copyright. Granted, this radical change would
285. See, e.g., Cumulus Media, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 304 F.3d
1167, 1173 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that trademark rights flow from use because a
mark represents the reputation of the goods and services associated with it).
286. See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1996)
("Rather than countenancing the 'removal' or retirement of the abandoned mark from
commercial speech, trademark law allows it to be used by another.").
287. Unlike the Litman proposal, the development of this doctrine does not require
congressional action. The current (and much more limited) abandonment doctrine in
copyright is a judicial creation that is not mentioned in the copyright statute. Kathleen M.
Bragg, Comment, The Termination of Transfers Provision of the 1976 Copyright Act: Is it
Time to Alienate It or Amend It?, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 769, 798 (2000); see supra note 260.
Accordingly, courts could simply adapt existing statutory common law to achieve this
contraction in protection.
288. Lessig makes a related proposal that copyright owners should be required to
reregister their work every five years. See LESSIG, supra note 17, at 251-52. The early
copyright statutes contained a similar rule except that the term between registrations was
longer. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 472-73 (2003).
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address only part of the problem, since abandonment deals with the
length of copyright protection and not with its breadth. But that just
reinforces the deep analogy between copyright abandonment and the
right of publicity. 289 Not only do both focus on a concrete intellectual
property interest that needs more consideration, but both are modest
in the sense that they do not claim to be comprehensive solutions to
the legal obsolescence wrought by technological change.
Furthermore, these similarities suggest one other thingabandonment has the best chance of garnering broad support and of
matching the right of publicity's success.29 °
In sum, the relationship between the satellite doctrines in
copyright and trademark can offer useful guidance on the potential of
the new efforts to transcend copyright's obsolescence. This is critical
not only for its illumination of contemporary policy, but as a way of
assessing the splintered future of intellectual property law with
respect to the creative arts.
CONCLUSION

It is a truism that necessity spurs action. This principle applies to
individual lives and to the collective expression of human values that
the law represents. Twice in the last century profound technological
change turned trademark and then copyright law upside down. In
each instance, a minority that could be described as innovative,
reckless, bold, or impatient proposed drastic remedies to deal with
the obsolescence left behind. Although these ideas have not replaced
the traditional frameworks of protection, they still exert a profound
influence on intellectual property law.
Moreover, by revealing the inverse parallels between the
289. See supra text accompanying notes 259-62.
290. The discussion of how Litman's reform and the time proposals connect with
equivalent doctrines in trademark suggests a final paradox. While past unfair competition
law and present copyright law are mirror opposites, the result of this inverse relationship
may be a convergence of copyright and trademark law around a similar set of concepts.
Explaining this development is not hard when one considers that trademark and
copyright are both pursuing moderation in protection. Trademark lawyers struggled for
decades to expand its reach and overcome the obsolete restrictions of the common law.
Meanwhile, copyright lawyers are currently grappling with the dilemma of how to
circumscribe its obsolete breadth. In other words, one body of law moved from no
protection to some, while the other is moving from broad protection to some. The
outcome, roughly speaking, is the same-moderate protection. In light of this move in the
direction of a similar level of incentives, it should come as no surprise that trademark and
copyright are also stumbling towards a similar mix of doctrines to set the boundaries of
that protection. Scholars in both areas may want to explore this gathering trend as a
fruitful source of insights.
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evolution of unfair competition and copyright, this Article
demonstrates the power of a comparative historical approach. In an
era where most lawyers and academics have convinced themselves
that pragmatism is their lodestar, the analysis here contains both a
comfort and a warning. The comfort is that history, which is often the
best evidence of pragmatism, can be a useful guide for policy
judgments. The warning is that, despite all of the advances in social
science over the past century, policymakers in a pinch are basically
behaving the same way now as they did back then. Greater selfawareness does not always lead to better decisions.

